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The Role of International Criminal Courts in the Formation of             
Customary International Law  
 
Abstract: 
 
This thesis examines the role that contemporary international criminal courts play in the 
formation of customary international law. It addresses applicable law and the case law of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR), the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), and the (permanent) International Criminal Court 
(ICC). More specifically, this thesis provides answers as to the role customary law plays as a 
source of applicable law in these courts and further, the role these courts play in developing 
the content of customary law. 
International criminal courts serve as important entities in discovering and interpreting 
existing rules of customary international law. Although these courts’ primary function is to 
apply existing law, not to create it, their case law forms an essential part of the formation 
process of customary international law. But uniting the legislative and judicial processes 
together diminishes the legitimacy of the resulting rules. The problem comes to the fore when 
international criminal courts broaden the scope of individual criminal liability by expanding 
the definitions of international crimes. The principle of legality –inherent to criminal law– 
prohibits retroactive crime creation and punishment and thus seems to prohibit courts from 
interpreting law expansively. However, throughout the history of international criminal law 
international criminal courts have been remarkably productive in their interpretations. 
This thesis examines the role of customary law in the practice of contemporary international 
criminal courts. It elaborates on the interplay between customary law and judicial decision 
and examines how traditional and modern approaches to custom formation deal with 
international courts as entities capable of forming new rules of customary law. Finally, it 
analyzes critically how rules of customary law have been discovered and identified in 
contemporary international criminal courts. By addressing the methods and arguments used 
in judicial reasoning it examines whether international criminal courts have fulfilled the 
requirements of the principle of legality in their work.  
The main argument of this thesis is that international criminal courts operate in the very heart 
of the customary law-making process. Their contribution to the corpus of international 
criminal law has been indispensable. However, the judicial creativity practiced by the modern 
international criminal courts seems to be on the decline as the ad hoc Tribunals (ICTY and 
ICTR) are concluding their work and the ICC begins to lead the way for the future 
application of international criminal law. 
 
III 
 
 
 
 
 
The one great principle of the English law is, to make business for itself. There 
is no other principle distinctly, certainly, and consistently maintained through all 
its narrow turnings. Viewed by this light it becomes a coherent scheme, and not 
the monstrous maze the laity are apt to think it. Let them but once clearly 
perceive that its grand principle is to make business for itself at their expense, 
and surely they will cease to grumble. 
Charles Dickens, Bleak House  
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XIX 
 
Introduction to the Thesis 
 
The concept of custom has aroused a considerable amount of disagreement among scholars 
and publicists. No other source of international law has been subject to such an enthusiastic 
scholarly debate. As Koskenniemi argues, “modern legal argument lacks a determinate, 
coherent concept of custom. Anything can be argued so as to be included within it as well as 
so as to be excluded from it.”1 
The basic idea of custom is straightforward: “A customary international law norm arises 
when states generally believe that it is desirable now or in the near future to have an 
authoritative legal principle or rule prescribing, permitting, or prohibiting certain conduct” 
and they act upon it.2 Customary norms traditionally form through consistent and uniform 
State practice supported by a general belief that such practice amounts to law and is binding 
(opinio juris). But how can this “general belief” be constituted, and what acts should be 
counted as State practice? Increasing uncertainty prevails over the content, respective 
emphasis, and even the whole necessity of these two elements of custom. In addition, there is 
no consensus over who has the authority to say whether there is enough support for a new 
rule of customary law to emerge. 
Some scholars propose that rules based on customary international law cannot have the same 
importance in international criminal law (ICL) as they have in public international law.3 In 
practice, however, customary law has served as a primary source of ICL. For instance, the 
subject-matter jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) is restricted to rules which are beyond any doubt part of customary international law. 
This limitation of applicable law was necessary at the time the Court was established, but it 
has caused substantial difficulty for the judges of the ICTY in their work. Their major 
problem was operating on a body of law that was still in its adolescence knowing that their 
contribution to its content was vital for the Court to succeed. 
Although some precedents in ICL may be found prior to the First World War, the Second 
World War and its war crime tribunals truly marked the beginning of ICL. But developments 
                                               
1
 Koskenniemi 2005, p. 409. 
2
 Lepard 2010, p. 8. Admittedly, Lepard’s point of view is quite forward looking and relies almost completely 
on opinio juris. Thus, it may be rejected by strict positivists. 
3
 See, e.g., Degan 2005, p. 51. 
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in ICL since the aftermath of the WWII and during the Cold War have been modest. The 
establishment of the ICTY marked the beginning of the renaissance of ICL. Since many of 
the ICL’s rules did not have a solid ground on customary international law (or in treaties) 
when the crimes within the ICTY’s jurisdiction were committed, the Court had to operate in 
the midst of the rules’ transformation from lex ferenda to lex lata. Under the pressure of 
providing justice for the victims and proving the efficiency of the enterprise of international 
criminal justice, the judges of the ICTY were forced to participate in developing the corpus of 
ICL. This called for a flexible evaluation on the methods of discovering customary 
international law. 
International courts serve as important entities in discovering and interpreting existing 
customary law. Courts’ primary function is to apply existing law, not to create it, but 
sometimes the borderline between lex lata and lex ferenda may seem indeterminate. As Boyle 
and Chinkin write, it is hard to identify when law in the making has evolved into law in 
action and this is the point on which States and international lawyers often disagree.4 In ICL, 
the most controversial issue has been the problem of non liquet: can judges in international 
criminal proceedings create new rules of customary law in order to fill in gaps or cure the 
imperfections of ICL? Several scholars answer in the negative and believe that judicial 
creativity violates a fundamental aspect of criminal law, the principle of legality. But at first 
glance this seems to be exactly what the ICTY has done. Paradoxically, Mettraux admits that 
“international criminal law may owe more to judges than any other part of international 
law”.5 
The Purpose and Arguments of this Thesis 
Customary international law contains so many “conceptual and practical enigmas”, as Lepard 
puts it, that it is impossible to deal with all of them here.6 Instead, this thesis looks at some of 
those enigmas through the lenses of criminal law. Following the mainstream positivist theory 
of sources this thesis examines the role of customary law in international criminal 
proceedings.7  This thesis focuses on describing how the process has changed during the 
modern era of ICL, rather than providing a new theory of custom formation. 
                                               
4
 Boyle & Chinkin 2007, p. 212. 
5
 Mettraux 2005, p. 14. 
6
 For an inclusive overview about the main issues of customary international law, see Lepard 2010, pp. 14-47. 
7
 Even though several writings favoring process-based or critical approaches are referred to in this thesis, the 
approach to the sources of law is mainly positivistic. Confrontations arise particularly in respect of the principle 
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The main purpose of this thesis is to examine the role of international criminal courts and 
tribunals in today’s customary law-making process. It critically analyzes how international 
criminal judges have discovered and identified rules of customary international law. The 
analysis concentrates specifically on the legitimacy of the resulting rules and whether they 
have managed to provide justice without derogating too much from the principle of legality. 
In addition, this thesis clarifies, inter alia, how the modernized view of custom works in the 
context of ICL. This includes addressing if and how the principle of legality, inherent to 
criminal law, reconciles with the modern law-making process. 
The progressive development of ICL through court decisions is a problematic issue that has 
solicited substantial discussion among scholars. There is certainly a thin line between 
evolutive interpretation and judicial creation. At first glance, dissenting opinions on the 
matter may seem like only verbiage and rhetoric but upon deeper reflection they are the very 
heart of this thesis. In the light of recent publications, the case law of the ICTY and the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is evaluated with great emphasis. Extending the 
analysis beyond the outcomes of these courts’ jurisprudence, this thesis elaborates on the 
arguments used in judicial reasoning concerning the foreseeability of the law. It reveals how 
judges in international criminal proceedings are perpetually maintaining the delicate balance 
between justice and legality. 
This thesis focuses on the following courts: the International Criminal Tribunals for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR), the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), 
and the (permanent) International Criminal Court (ICC).  The three UN Tribunals are 
considered because of their international organization status.8 The primary focus is the case 
law of the ICTY and ICTR (hereinafter referred as the ad hoc Tribunals) because these courts 
were the first post-Cold War criminal tribunals –referred to as the first modern international 
tribunals by some–9 that had the opportunity to serve as forerunners in the era of progressive 
development of ICL. The case law of the ICTY, in particular, is remarkable in this respect. 
However, as the ad hoc Tribunals are concluding their work, the ICC will become 
                                                                                                                                                  
of legality. If international law is seen, for instance, merely as a process of decision making the principle of 
legality loses its sole purpose. See, e.g. Erdemović Appeal Judgment, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Cassese, para. 11. 
8
 The ICTY and ICTR are subsidiary organs of the UN and they are created by the UN Security Council. The 
SCSL is created by agreement between the UN and Sierra Leone, so it is an international organization ipso facto. 
9
 See, e.g., Gallant 2009, p. 304. 
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increasingly significant as it forges the future of ICL.10 This thesis aims to show how the ad 
hoc Tribunals and the ICC differ in their approaches to the sources of international law. 
The main argument of this thesis contends that international criminal courts operate in the 
very heart of the customary law-making process. Their contribution to the corpus of ICL has 
been indispensable. Consequentially, the significance of the strict recourse to the principle of 
legality has been down played. Indeed, international criminal courts, specifically the ad hoc 
Tribunals, have applied a somewhat loose definition of the principle of legality, particularly 
in terms of the requirement of specificity, by emphasizing the criminal nature of an act rather 
than the exact definition of a crime in identifying international crimes. 
However, the judicial creativity practiced in the modern international criminal courts may be 
a phenomenon of the ad hoc Tribunals alone.11 This thesis evaluates how the ICC affects the 
readings of the principle of legality in future and whether the era of judicial creativity is 
coming to an end. 
The Structure of this Thesis 
Part I (Sections 1-4) analyzes the sources of ICL contemporary international criminal courts 
draw on in international criminal proceedings. The purpose of this section is to define the 
limits within which these courts operate as well as identify the tools with which they work. 
These limits and tools are not the same for all courts. A brief analysis on the applicable law 
of the ad hoc Tribunals and the ICC is provided in order to highlight these differences. Part I 
also functions as an introduction for part II, which addresses the way courts have used these 
tools in their jurisprudence and whether they have remained within the given limits. 
Part II forms the cornerstone of this thesis and deals with the customary law-making process. 
It begins with the assumption that the formation of customary norms requires both basic 
elements of customary law, State practice and opinio juris. 12  Section 5 evaluates the 
traditional and modern theories of customary law. Section 6 deals with the initial question of 
whether international criminal courts are able to form new customary rules in the first place. 
Focusing on the practice of the UN Tribunals, particularly the ICTY, Section 7 examines 
                                               
10
 The primary focus is on the subject-matter jurisdiction, i.e., jurisdiction ratione materiae, of these courts: the 
application of the law of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Leaving the actual changes in the 
law aside, the thesis appraises the methods used by international criminal courts to identify and develop 
customary norms. 
11
 The focus is on contemporary international criminal courts, so the creativity practiced at the WWII trials is 
appraised here only limitedly. 
12
 For an alternative view see, e.g., Lepard 2010. 
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whether contemporary international criminal courts have adopted the modern approach in 
identifying rules of customary international law. Finally, Section 8 examines whether these 
courts have fully applied the principle of legality in developing law by progressive 
interpretations. In other words, has the law of the UN Tribunals been foreseeable and 
accessible to individuals? 
Part III looks at some future perspectives of customary law in the context of ICL. It also 
functions as a concluding chapter for the whole thesis. Section 10 consists of concluding 
remarks. 
The distribution of the subject matter under several headings is artificial and only made for 
the purposes of this thesis. Some issues and cases are approached from various perspectives 
and therefore may come to the fore several times in different contexts. Some sections may 
overlap and all the sections are strongly intertwined. 
Few Notes from the Author 
The Scope of International Criminal Law 
 
A word needs to be said about the scope of ICL. This work deals with international crimes in 
the strict sense, i.e., crimes against international law, or the international community,13 
sometimes referred as the “core crimes of international law” or “international crimes 
proper”. 14  These are to be distinguished from so-called transnational crimes, which are 
simply crimes that involve transcending national boundaries. Essentially, the difference is 
that the former crimes are subject to international criminalization while the latter ones are 
criminalized in national laws. The core crimes cover war crimes, crimes against humanity 
and genocide (and perhaps the crime of aggression).15 
The Fragmentation of ICL 
 
Both national and international courts participate in developing ICL. This is bound to cause 
fragmentation since national courts interpret international regulations in the context of their 
own domestic legal systems and apply their own principles of law alongside the international 
                                               
13
 Some crimes, such as piracy, are deemed to be crimes against States (compared to crimes against the 
international community) and therefore not really international crimes per se. See Cassese 2008. 
14
 See, e.g., Lee 2010. 
15
 The Rome Statute provides for “conditional” jurisdiction over the crime of aggression depending on the 
agreement over the definition of the offence. See Rome Statute art. 5.  On 11 June 2010, the Review Conference 
held in Kampala adopted amendments to the Rome Statute and decided that the Court will not be able to 
exercise its jurisdiction over the crime until 2017 when State parties should decide to activate the jurisdiction.  
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ones. 16  ICL is thus influenced by several domestic legal systems. In addition, the 
jurisprudence of different international criminal courts is not particularly uniform. Although 
the establishment of the contemporary international criminal courts has solidified and 
clarified ICL to some extent, the Rome Statute diverges in some cases from the practice of 
the ad hoc Tribunals.17 In fact, the Rome Statute clearly differentiates itself from the residual 
ICL.18 In the absence of a decisive international criminal court, there is no author that would 
have the last word upon the unclear issues of ICL.19 
Therefore, we are distinguishing between multiple sets of ICL, that of the ICC regime, those 
of regional criminal tribunals, and those based on States’ cooperation.20 Since this thesis 
addresses customary law of international criminal courts, particularly custom created at the 
UN Tribunals, the impact of domestic jurisprudence is appraised only limitedly. However, 
one should bear in mind this possible distinction since it is likely to undermine overall 
statements about the content of ICL. The problem of fragmentation is considered throughout 
this thesis and addressed more closely in Section 9. 
The Principle of Legality 
 
In respect of to the principle of legality, this thesis addresses only its prohibition of 
retroactive crime creation (nullum crimen sine lege) and leaves the issues concerning 
sentencing (nulla poena sine lege) aside. 
                                               
16
 Haveman sees that through the praxis of international criminal tribunals a new field of law, supranational 
criminal law, is developing. This can be separated from “traditional” international (interstate) criminal law. 
Compared to this traditional ICL, where States work together and which is implemented through national 
judicial systems, supranational criminal law goes beyond States and is maintained by international tribunals. 
This field of law, with humanitarian law as its subject matter, is still in its adolescence and without precedent. 
Haveman 2003 (A), pp. 3-5. 
17
 Many national judicial systems have followed the provisions of the Rome Statute that differ from those of the 
ad hoc Tribunals (definitions of war crimes would be a good example of this). This has also growth the 
fragmentation of ICL. For example, the ICC’s provisions concerning aiding and abetting and command 
responsibility differ from the case law of the ICTY. For aiding and abetting see Rome Statute art. 25(3)(c) and 
Furundžija; For command responsibility see Rome Statute art. 28; See also Heikkilä 2011, pp. 920, 925, fn. 68. 
18
 See articles 10 and 22(3) of the Rome Statute. 
19
 Cassese 2008, pp. 42-43. The Rome Statute has clarified certain concepts of ICL, but the restricted 
jurisdiction of the ICC as well as its hierarchical equivalence with other international courts set limits to the 
international influence of the Rome Statute. 
20
 ICC works alongside inter alia the ad hoc Tribunals established by the UN Security Council (ICTY and 
ICTR), hybrid ad hoc tribunals (the courts of Cambodia, Lebanon, and Sierra Leone), and national courts that 
have international judges appointed by UN (the Special Panel for East Timor, Bosnia’s war crime chamber and 
Kosovo’s courts). ICL can also be seen as a hybrid model that does not separate ICL from domestic laws but 
operates simultaneously on both. For a distinction between different types of ICL see Greenawalt 2011. 
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PART I  
CUSTOMARY LAW IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS 
 
 
1. Sources of International Criminal Law 
 
The approach to the sources of ICL differs to some extent from that of public (general) 
international law. For instance, the principle of legality sets out certain requirements in 
respect of individual criminal liability. Moreover, international criminal procedure differs 
profoundly from usual international court processes since it is not a dispute between 
sovereign States but a trial of accusation concerning individual persons. This sets out certain 
requirements for the foreseeability and accessibility of the law. 
It is evident that the sources of law in international criminal proceedings are not the same as 
in national criminal proceedings, but it is not clear whether they can be exactly the same as in 
public international law proceedings either, given the demands of the principle of legality. It 
is safe to say that applicable law in international criminal proceedings emanates from the 
sources of public international law, but the question remains whether this set of sources is 
directly applicable in ICL, and if not, what are the differences? Furthermore, is there a 
hierarchy between the sources? As Nollkaemper puts it, “[t]he formal sources of international 
law do not provide a full account of the methods of judicial determination and interpretation 
of the law as evidenced in the practice of the [ICTY] Tribunal.”21 In this paper, I aim to 
demonstrate the differences between the sources of public international law and the sources 
of ICL as well as the reasons behind these differences. 
1.1 Sources of International Law 
Since ICL is a subcategory of public international law, it is necessary to elaborate on the 
sources of the latter in order to understand the former. It is not reasonable to view any part of 
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 Nollkaemper 2003, p. 295. 
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international law in isolation from the whole system. 22  Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute 
represents still the most authoritative provision on the sources of international law. Although 
the ICJ Statute is a treaty in itself, it is generally agreed to have achieved a status of 
customary international law. The provision reads as follows: 
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such 
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: 
 
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognized by the contesting states; 
b.  international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
c.  the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
d.  subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the 
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for 
the determination of rules of law. 
 
Although it seems that the sources are listed in a hierarchical order, it is generally agreed that 
article 38(1) does not assign any source priority between the three main sources indicated in 
subparagraphs (a)-(c). In practice, however, international lawyers usually turn first to any 
applicable treaty regulations, then custom, and last to the general principles of law. The 
sources indicated in subparagraph (d) are of a subsidiary nature compared to the three main 
sources.23 
Since treaties bind only States which are parties to them, custom can be regarded as “the 
fundamental source of international law”.24 Some academic even argue that there exist only 
two main sources, custom and treaty, and all other norms derive their pedigree from these.25 
But the general principles of law are still applied as an autonomous source when they are not 
transformed into customary law.26 However, there exists continuous interplay between the 
three main sources. In this respect, they can all be seen as bidirectional. For instance, 
customary rules can be used to pinpoint the general principles of law or to clarify the content 
of treaties, but they can also emerge themselves through the evidence that general principles 
or treaties provide. 27  Additionally, judicial decisions play also an important role in 
international law despite their subsidiary character. This is partly because much of the rules 
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 Boyle & Chinkin 2007, p. 211. 
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 See, e.g., Degan 2005, p. 50; Lepard 2010, p. 270. 
24
 Kelly 2000, p. 452; Degan 2005. 
25
 See Schabas (2006), pp. 75-76. 
26
 Degan 2005, p.50; Schabas 2010, p. 385. 
27
 There are three ways in which treaties may have an effect on customary law. A treaty can reflect existing law 
as a codification of customary law, the negotiation process of a treaty may crystallize the customary rule in 
question, or the treaty can subsequently become accepted as a part of customary law. North Sea Continental 
Shelf Cases, paras 60-82; See also Cryer 2006, p. 242. 
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of international law are unwritten; the determination of the content of law is often left to 
judges. 
1.2 Sources of International Criminal Law 
Since ICL is a subset of public international law, it can be said that its sources are those of 
international law, i.e., those enumerated in the ICJ Statute.28 However, due to the nature of 
criminal proceedings, certain requirements characteristic to criminal law only must be taken 
account. The Rome Statute contains a slightly different set of sources for the ICC to apply. 
Article 21 of the Rome Statute indicating applicable law of the Court reads as follows: 
  
1.          The Court shall apply: 
 
(a)    In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence; 
(b)     In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and the 
principles and rules of international law, including the established 
principles of the international law of armed conflict; 
(c)      Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court from national 
laws of legal systems of the world including, as appropriate, the national 
laws of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime, 
provided that those principles are not inconsistent with this Statute and 
with international law and internationally recognized norms and standards. 
 
2.     The Court may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous 
decisions. 
 
3.        The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article must be 
consistent with internationally recognized human rights, and be without 
any adverse distinction founded on grounds such as gender as defined in 
article 7, paragraph 3, age, race, colour, language, religion or belief, 
political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, wealth, birth or 
other status.29 
 
This provision offers an alternative list of sources for the authoritative article 38(1) of the ICJ 
Statute. This is remarkable since there are no other lists of sources of international law that 
would be commonly agreed upon. Although article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute indicates the 
sources of public international law, it cannot be disregarded in the field of ICL, and the Rome 
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 See, e.g., Cryer et al. 2010, p. 9; Cassese 2008, p. 14; Akande 2009, p. 41. 
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 Articles 31(3) and 66(1) also refer to applicable law. According to article 31(3), criminal responsibility may 
be excluded by other grounds than those of article 21. Article 66(1) includes the presumption of innocence: 
“Everyone shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty before the Court in accordance with the applicable 
law.” 
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Statute provision follows up this provision by and large. The Rome Statute is remarkable also 
because it represents the only international written instrument that provides both the “general 
part” of ICL and the definitions of crimes. 
But the rules of the Rome Statute are applicable to the ICC alone.  As all international 
criminal courts are bound to apply their own statutes, there is no universal “international 
criminal code” for the courts to apply. However, the Rome Statute holds some importance 
outside the ICC as well since it clarifies several points of ICL. Other international courts have 
cited the Statute in their jurisprudence and some of its provisions may already be held as 
codifications of customary international law. But since the Statute is not a codification of ICL 
per se, several of its provisions go beyond customary law. Yet even these provisions may 
achieve customary law status later if they are largely accepted and applied by other entities.30 
Thus, the Rome Statute does not represent the final word in the field of ICL. Although some 
have argued that it represents something close to definitive, even where it is controversial,31 
article 10 of the Rome Statute indicates clearly that the law outside the Statute may continue 
to develop in the other direction.32 
What comes to the hierarchy of the sources, each international criminal court must apply the 
regulations of its own statute in the first place. If such regulations are lacking or contain gaps, 
customary law, applicable treaties, and the general principles of law are to be applied. As in 
public international law, there exists no hierarchy between treaties and customary law, except 
that customary law is usually referred as the main source of law whereas treaties can be 
regarded as lex specialis.33 Thus, the need to rely upon customary rules emerges usually when 
there is no treaty provision to use or the content of applicable provisions is unclear. The third 
primary source, the general principles of law, is more complex to categorize since in some 
cases it forms its own independent source of law, while in other cases it forms a unity with 
the two other main sources. In practice, general principles are often used to fill in gabs when 
customary law and treaties are silent, but they cannot be said to be subsidiary in relation to 
the two other main sources. 
The way I see it, is that the sources of ICL derive from the sources of public international law 
but there are some differences to be found, in particular what comes to their respective 
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 Cryer 2006, pp. 257-262. 
32
 See also article 22(3) of the Rome Statute. 
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emphasis and hierarchical order (this is demonstrated in the following sections). First of all, 
customary law holds a great importance in ICL because the main addressees of ICL are 
individuals (instead of States) and there are not many treaties that are directly applicable to 
individuals. Moreover, each international criminal court has its own regulations provided in 
its statute. For this reason it is important to identify the organ which task is to apply ICL. 
However, some common features can be drawn from the statutes and practices of these courts. 
This is not only useful but vital for international criminal proceedings since the statutes of 
these courts, with the exception of the Rome Statute, do not offer an exhaustive list of sources 
for the courts to apply. In addition, prosecutions for international crimes may take place in 
national courts or in hybrid tribunals, which also may have to rely on the sources ICL. 
When addressing the sources of law applicable to a specific international criminal court, it is 
important to acknowledge when the court was established and take account the state of 
evolution of ICL at the time. Given the lack of regulations in ICL in the 20th century, the first 
international criminal tribunals have not been able to apply the sources of international law 
directly as they are set out in the ICJ Statute. As ICL continues to develop, future courts may 
have better possibilities to comply with the Statute. 
2. Applicable Law in Contemporary International Criminal Courts 
 
The approach to the sources of law differs between the UN Tribunals and the ICC. This is 
mainly due that the UN Tribunals are ex post facto courts whereas the ICC is established ex 
ante. The statutes of the UN Tribunals are retrospective and thus not law themselves; they 
merely point to law existing at the time of the alleged offences. In contrast, the Rome Statute 
offers a prospective penal code for the ICC to apply in future cases. As Degan writes, “we are 
now faced with two tracks in international criminal proceedings.”34 The UN Tribunals have 
rather deficient statutes supported by rich judicial practice and frequently amended RPE. In 
contrast, the Rome Statute offers a much more elaborated and nearly exhaustive text together 
with the Elements of Crimes and very detailed RPE. The only thing missing is the practice of 
the ICC, i.e., the application and interpretation of these complex rules. The following section 
is centered upon the subject-matter jurisdiction of these international criminal courts. 
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2.1 Subject-Matter Jurisdiction of the UN Tribunals 
The international criminal tribunals of the UN are mix ups of two legal systems, national law 
and international law. At international level, the Tribunals are dealing with international 
humanitarian law, international criminal law, and international human rights law. The 
possibility to apply national criminal law (of the State where the crime was committed) is 
authorized in all three statutes.35 When the applicable law instruments of their statutes do not 
offer a solution, the Tribunals draw upon national laws. However, the Tribunals are 
independent institutions of international law and bound only by international legal norms.36 
In respect of international norms, the ICTY has acknowledged article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute 
as “a complete statement of the sources of international law”.37 
As noted, the primary legal instruments of the UN Tribunals are their statutes.38 The statutes 
of the ICTY and ICTR are Security Council’s resolutions adopted pursuant to Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter.39 The ad hoc Tribunals themselves are subsidiary organs of the Security 
Council, established pursuant to article 29 of the Charter. The Statute of the SCSL differs 
from these in that it is an agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the United 
Nations; it is based on an international treaty between a sovereign State and an 
intergovernmental organization.40 The SCSL Statute binds only the two parties, so it has no 
provision on State cooperation with the Court, as the ad hoc Tribunals have.41 The statutes of 
the ad hoc Tribunals are binding on all member States by virtue of article 25 of the UN 
Charter. 
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 ICTY Statute, art. 24(1); ICTR Statute, art. 23(1); SCSL Statute, art. 14(2). National law has more prominent 
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The subject-matter jurisdiction of the UN Tribunals consists of “serious violations of 
international humanitarian law”.42 However, all three tribunals have also jurisdiction over 
offences that were committed during peacetime, so they are not merely “war crime tribunals” 
as often misleadingly referred.43 Two types of crimes are common to all three tribunals, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity, albeit the definitions may differ from one statute to 
another. In addition, all tribunals have created provisions concerning the contempt of court44 
and perjury,45 over which they have jurisdiction due to their “inherent powers”.46 The SCSL 
differs from the ad hoc Tribunals in that it has no jurisdiction over genocide, but does have 
jurisdiction over certain crimes under Sierra Leonean law.47 
Of the three UN Tribunals, the SCSL has the closest relationship to national laws. Some 
provisions concerning sexual offences against children are incorporated from Sierra Leonean 
criminal law to the SCSL Statute.48 The judges are also guided by procedural rules of Sierra 
Leone when amending the RPE. Moreover, they are always guided by the decisions of the 
Supreme Court of Sierra Leone in the interpretation and application of the national laws of 
Sierra Leone.49 The subject-matter jurisdiction of the ad hoc Tribunals is elaborated more 
closely in the following chapters.50 
2.1.1 The ICTY 
There is no exact provision dealing with applicable law in the ICTY Statute but this can be 
derived from articles 2-5, which indicate the crimes under the Court’s jurisdiction. Article 2 
refers to grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, article 3 to violations of laws or 
customs of war, article 4 to genocide, and article 5 to crimes against humanity. The UN 
Secretary-General famously held that the ICTY “should apply rules of international 
humanitarian law which are beyond any doubt part of customary law” and continued that the 
part of conventional international humanitarian law which is beyond doubt part of customary 
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law includes the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) with annexed 
regulations, the Genocide Convention, and the IMT Charter.51  Articles 2-5 of the ICTY 
Statute were drafted according to the provisions of these conventions. Following the 
statement of the Security-General, the Appeals Chamber has held that the criminal liability is 
to be grounded “on firm foundations of customary law”.52 
Therefore, it seems that the ICTY has no jurisdiction over offences of national law or treaty 
law unless they have become part of customary international law. 53  Contradictory, the 
Appeals Chamber has implied in several obiter dicta that the Court would have jurisdiction 
over violations of treaty law as long as the requirements of the principle of legality are met.54 
However, the Appeals Chamber has never actually acted upon it. Instead, it has consistently 
relied upon customary international law in its rulings. 55  To make an exception, a Trial 
Chamber has once resorted to treaty law as a sole basis of criminal conduct within its 
jurisdiction.  In Galić, the crimes of “terror” and “attacks on civilians” were based on 
Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Convention without indicating whether it represented 
customary international law.56 By this ruling the Trial Chamber ignored the direction of the 
Secretary-General as well as the precedent of the Appeals Chamber requiring its jurisdiction 
to be grounded “on firm foundations of customary law”.57 
Although the Secretary-General declared that the Geneva Conventions are beyond any doubt 
part of customary law, this does not mean that all (or any) of their provisions indicate 
individual criminal responsibility. Several provisions of the four Geneva Conventions and 
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 Report of the UN Secretary-General (S/25704), paras. 34 and 35. This report, according to article 32 of the 
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55
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their Additional Protocols have subsequently proved to provide for criminal liability under 
customary international law, but this differs from the Trial Chamber’s point of view in Galić 
that the treaty itself may serve as a basis for criminal liability. According to Mettraux, the 
Geneva Conventions are binding qua treaty law only upon signatory States, not upon 
individuals.58 
It is not excluded that a treaty could provide for individual criminal responsibility, but the 
Geneva Conventions were never meant to do this; they are international treaties between and 
binding only upon the signatory States, not individuals. Moreover, the Secretary-General’s 
proclamation indicates clearly that the jurisdictional scope of the ICTY is restricted to 
customary international law. In other words, crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICTY have 
to be binding upon individuals qua customary law, not treaties.59 In this light, the Galić 
judgment cannot be held as a guiding precedent. Mettraux notes that it is only Trial Chamber 
level judgment and represents merely a deplorable exception of the rule confirming that the 
subject-matter jurisdiction of the ICTY is based firmly on customary international law.60 
Mettraux’s point of view suggests that those provisions of the Geneva Conventions that have 
proved to provide for individual criminal responsibility in the jurisprudence of the ICTY have 
done this qua customary law. This is in line with the Secretary-General’s proclamation as 
well as the Appeals Chamber’s aforementioned alignment that criminal liability should be 
grounded on customary law. Having said this, it is striking that the Appeals Chamber 
afterwards rejected Galić’s argument that the Tribunal’s jurisdiction for crimes under article 3 
of the Statute can only be based on customary international law. On the face of it, this 
statement seems to be contrary to the alignment taken in the jurisprudence of the ICTY. 
However, the Court still did not entirely let lose its grasp on customary law. After declaring 
that treaty provisions may provide basis for the Tribunal’s jurisdiction ratione materiae, it 
held that “in practice the International Tribunal always ascertains that the treaty provision in 
question is also declaratory of custom.”61 
The so called “battle over sources” has resulted in the emergence of two schools at the ICTY, 
one arguing that the Tribunal may apply treaty provisions (binding on the parties to a conflict) 
                                               
58
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irrespective of their customary law status, the other resorting solely on customary law.62 
Moreover, there exist differing opinions on whether international criminal tribunals in general 
should apply treaty crimes that have not yet been accepted as part of customary international 
law.63 Hardly anyone suggests that treaty provisions could not provide for criminal liability at 
all. On the contrary, the Rome Statute offers a perfect example of this. However, in the 
ICTY’s practice this has not been the case. Even though treaties play an important role in its 
jurisprudence, they seem to work only as evidencing the customary law status of certain 
norms. 
Several treaties create criminal responsibility, but in order to do this they must include 
provisions that clearly indicate crimes and are directly binding on individuals. Some treaty 
provisions such as the Genocide Convention and grave breaches provisions do this while 
several other provisions, particularly those of international humanitarian law, do not usually 
indicate individual criminal responsibility. Akande argues that only in the latter provisions 
the transformation from Sate responsibility to individual responsibility takes place under 
customary international law. Hence, these rules are not applied qua treaty law but qua 
customary law that is based on treaty provisions.64  
Both of the statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals have been criticized as poorly drafted since a 
number of lacunae have been revealed in their regulations.65 For instance, the statutes do not 
provide any regulations concerning general principles. Even though the judges are authorized 
to adopt their own RPE and “other appropriate matters”66, the statutes are silent on general 
principles. In their practice, however, the Tribunals have frequently resorted to this source of 
law. In the absence of written rules the ICTY Trial Chamber has declared that: 
any time the Statute does not regulate a specific matter, and the Report of the Secretary-
General does not prove to be of any assistance in the interpretation of the Statute, it falls 
to the International Tribunal to draw upon (i) rules of customary international law or (ii) 
general principles of international criminal law; or, lacking such principles, (iii) general 
principles of criminal law common to the major legal systems of the world; or, lacking 
such principles, (iv) general principles of law consonant with the basic requirements of 
international justice.67 
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One peculiar case concerning the jurisdiction of the ICTY tribunal is the case of contempt. 
The ICTY has convicted persons of contempt of the Tribunal even though it has failed to 
provide customary law basis for this. Instead, the Appeals Chamber has held that it has 
inherent powers, derived from the general principles of law, to punish persons for contempt.68 
Notwithstanding the discrepancy in the ICTY’s jurisprudence, customary law has maintained 
its leading status in the battle over the sources of law. The Appeals Chamber’s argument in 
Galić does not deprive the fact that in practice the subject-matter jurisdiction of the ICTY 
consists of crimes based on customary international law. It is understandable that there exist 
different opinions on this even within the Court itself since customary law contains 
uncertainties that are unfamiliar to written laws. Even the drafters of the ICTY and ICTR 
statutes had different approaches to this question as the violations of Additional Protocol II 
were included within the jurisdiction of the ITCR even though the Protocol was not accepted 
as part of customary international law at the time. 
2.1.2 The ICTR 
The subject-matter jurisdiction of the ICTR is almost identical with the ICTY what comes to 
crimes against humanity and genocide, but war crimes form an exception. In this respect the 
subject-matter jurisdiction of the ICTR is narrower. It is limited to concern only violations of 
article 3 of the Geneva Conventions (and Additional Protocol II), whereas the ICTY Statute 
includes the grave breaches of the Conventions in their entirety as well as “violations of the 
laws or customs of war”. The more limited jurisdiction can be explained by the internal 
nature of the Rwandan conflict. In addition, except for some provisions of the Additional 
Protocol II the violations of Hague law are not covered by the ICTR Statute. Both the ICTY 
and the ICTR statutes include the open-ended definition of war crimes: “These violations 
shall include, but shall not be limited to…”69 However, in its practice the ICTR has limited its 
war crimes to those expressly stated in the Statute, unlike the ICTY.70 
On one point, the jurisdictional scope of the ICTR is defined more broadly than in the ICTY. 
As noted, article 4 of the ICTR Statute includes violations of Additional Protocol II of the 
Geneva Convention even though the protocol was not deemed to be a part of customary 
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international law at the time.71 This seems to broaden the subject-matter jurisdiction of the 
ICTR to include certain violations of treaties. However, the practice of the ICTR indicates 
that it actually applies customary law in respect of its subject-matter jurisdiction. The 
Appeals Chamber has noted that the Security Council “was not creating new law but was 
inter alia codifying existing customary rules for the purposes of the jurisdiction for the 
ICTR” when the ICTR Statute was drafted.72 
Thus, although the Security Council has authorized the ICTR to apply conventional 
humanitarian law instruments, the ICTR has refused to grasp on this opportunity. The line 
taken by the ICTR demonstrates an appropriate discretion on behalf of the Court as well as 
the importance it gives to customary international law as a source of ICL. Indeed, Mettraux 
points out several reasons why the ICTR should also apply only customary law. First, if the 
ICTR relies upon conventional law it still has to establish that the violation of a given treaty 
provision entails individual criminal responsibility. Secondly, recourse to customary law 
allows judges to take account the possible evolution of norms after their pronouncement. 
Thirdly, the ICTR has to turn to customary law in any case since treaties do not cover all the 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. Resorting to only one source of law guarantees 
some conformity in its rulings and gives them particular authority even outside the ICTR’s 
jurisprudence. In this way, the ICTR may also participate in developing ICL through its 
jurisprudence, even though this is not its primary purpose.73 
2.2 Subject-Matter Jurisdiction of the ICC 
The Rome Statute is the first international criminal court statute that provides a provision 
dealing with applicable law. The aforementioned article 21 provision is an important 
innovation for several reasons. As noted, it offers an alternative list of sources alongside the 
ICJ Statute. Secondly, judges of the ICC cannot determine themselves the sources of law they 
would draw upon, as has been the case with the ad hoc Tribunals to some extent. Thirdly, 
there is a clear hierarchy of sources in article 21(1). Only the case law of the Court 
(paragraph 2) is left without any reference to the hierarchy. The final paragraph 3 refers to the 
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whole article making it subject to “internationally recognized human rights”.74 As mentioned, 
article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute does not assign any hierarchy between the main sources of 
public international law, even though it makes a distinction between them and the subsidiary 
means for determining legal rules. 
Besides the hierarchical layout of the subparagraphs (a)-(c), there is also a hierarchy between 
the three primary sources (the Statute, the Elements of Crimes, and the Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence). Even though article 21(1)(a) in itself does not seem to indicate any hierarchy 
between them, articles 9(3) and 51(5) make clear that the Statute prevails over inconsistencies 
of the other two instruments.75 
Most importantly, the crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction are defined extensively.  This is 
apt to prevent the problem of non liquet. However, the definitions are not fully exhaustive 
and this leaves some discretion to the judges.  It is exactly for this purpose that the Elements 
of Crimes are appended to the Statute. According to article 9 they “shall assist the Court in 
the interpretation and application of articles 6, 7 and 8” which contain the definitions of 
crimes.76 
As a secondary source the Court shall apply applicable treaties as well as the principles and 
rules of international law.77 There is no hierarchy between them. The term “international law” 
refers to public international law.78 The wording “principles and rules of international law” of 
article 21(1)(b) suggests recourse to the three principal sources enumerated in article 38 of 
the ICJ Statute, namely treaties, custom, and general principles. 79  Thus, the Court is 
authorized to apply customary international law as well. Degan criticizes the vague wording 
of the provisions since it does not distinguish between the three main sources and therefore 
relieves the Court from the difficult task of proving the customary status of “principles and 
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rules” it wishes to apply.80 However, the Court’s recourse to general international law as a 
normative source has been modest.81 
The principles and rules of international law include also “the established principles of the 
international law of armed conflict”.82 This body of law is complex, but largely codified in 
the fourth Hague Convention of 1907,83 the four Geneva Conventions of 1949,84 and their 
Additional Protocols, adopted in 1977.85 But since there are still many provisions that can be 
found from customary law only the Court may have to recourse to this source of law when 
dealing with armed conflicts. Then, for instance, the customary law study conducted by the 
ICRC may prove to be highly relevance.86  
Finally, the Court may apply the general principles of law derived from national legal 
systems. Schabas suggests that this source of law should be distinguished from the “general 
principles of law” as meant in article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute. According to him, article 
21(1)(c) should not be used to determine the content of  public international law, but to form 
subsidiary source of norms through a comparative criminal law survey.87 So far, the Court 
has not been very keen to draw from national practice as a source for general principles.88 
The Court is free to use all the sources of article 21(1) as an aid for the interpretation of the 
Statute.89 The hierarchy emerges when these are used as independent sources. In Bashir the 
Pre-Trial Chamber I held that “those other sources of law provided for in paragraphs (l)(b) 
and (l)(c) of article 21 of the Statute, can only be applied when the following two conditions 
are met: (i) there is a lacuna in the written law contained in the Statute, the Elements of 
Crimes and the Rules; and (ii) such lacuna cannot be filled by the application of the criteria 
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provided for in articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties and 
article 21(3) of the Statute.”90 
According to Schabas, there is a tendency in the practice of the Court to treat the sources of 
article 21(1)(a) as a complete codification of sources, particularly what comes to procedural 
rules. Chambers have refused several times to compose new procedural rules from other 
sources than those enumerated in article 21(1)(a), i.e., the Statute, Elements of Crimes and 
the RPE.91 For example, in Katanga the Pre-Trial Chamber rejected new modes of liability 
based on customary international law, since “[p]rinciples and rules of law constitute a 
secondary source applicable only when the statutory material fails to prescribe a legal 
solution.”92 
Article 21(2) authorizes the Court to follow its previous decisions. This is not a rule of stare 
decisis, however, since the Court is not obligate to do this; the wording of the provision is 
merely permissive. Moreover, the article does not indicate any hierarchy between the 
decisions of various chambers. Even though the Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers are not inferior 
compared to the Appeals Chamber, it is suggested that there should be hierarchical order that 
gives priority to the rulings of the Appeals Chamber.93 This is also the case with the ad hoc 
Tribunals for there is no rule of hierarchy of decisions in their statutes but in practice the 
Trial Chambers are bound by the ratio decidendi of rulings of the Appeals Chamber.94 
According to the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY, the rule that its higher courts follow their 
previous decisions is a matter of “consistency, certainty, and predictability”.95 The ICC has 
followed its earlier decisions on several occasions, and it seems that there is a tendency that 
the Pre-Trial and Trial Chambers hold rulings of the Appeals Chamber as binding decisions. 
What comes to other judicial bodies, the ICC has often referred to the case law of the ad hoc 
Tribunals and the ECtHR, but precedents of these courts are in no sense binding, and the 
Court has actually departed from their ruling on several occasions.96 
Article 21(3) reflects the growth of the international human rights movement at the time of 
creation of the ICC. This article is not just verbiage; it guides the application and 
interpretation of all other provisions of the Statute, including the other sources of law. 
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Repeatedly cited in the Court’s early case law, this provision has proved to possess great 
potential and fundamental role in the Court’s work. For instance, human right sources have 
strengthened and expanded the fair trial rights set out in the Statute. Article 21(3) has also 
affected to the creation of several procedural innovations not listed in the Statute, what comes 
to victim participation and protection in particular. 97 In this respect, once could argue that 
customary law has affected the case law of the ICC. 
Although customary law is listed as a source of applicable law in the Rome Statute, it is most 
likely to play a remarkably smaller role in the ICC compared to the ad hoc Tribunals. This is 
because of the detailed provisions of the Rome Statute and hierarchically higher status of the 
sources in subparagraph (a). Even if some provisions in the Statute depart from customary 
international law, the Elements of Crimes take precedence over customary law. However, 
article 31(3) of the Rome Statute gives special weight to customary rules in respect of 
grounds excluding criminal responsibility since it allow customary rules to take precedence 
over the Statute.98 Moreover, customary rules may become relevant in assessing the mental 
element of crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction whenever the Statute or the Elements of 
Crimes do not provide a specific mens rea.99 
2.3 Concluding Remarks 
The UN Tribunals’ approach to the sources of international law differs profoundly from that 
of the ICC. Whereas ICC clearly treats custom as a secondary source of law, the UN 
Tribunals have applied it as a primary source of law. Although the ad hoc Tribunals have 
been authorized to resort to treaty law instruments, they have not seized this opportunity. 
Their case law reveals that the Tribunals have firmly followed the rules of customary law 
with respect to their subject-matter jurisdiction. 
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3. Custom and Other Sources of Substantive International Criminal Law 
3.1 The Generality of Customary Law 
Customary international law comprises the rules of international law that emerge through a 
general practice accepted as law, as stated in the ICJ Statute. More generally, it can be 
understood to comprise all rules of international law that are not covered by treaties: the 
unwritten rules of international law. Naturally, those rules can also derive from the general 
principles of law but in practice international lawyers and judges tend to turn to customary 
law whenever there are no treaty provisions to apply. Often the general principles of law are 
associated with customary law in such a manner that it is impossible to identify which of the 
two sources a given rule is derived from. Regardless of this, customary law holds particular 
prominence in ICL since it is the only unwritten source of law on the basis of which 
individuals can be held criminally responsible.100 For this reason general principles are often 
used only to ascertain the content of customary law. 
General principles have played a major role in the jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals and 
they have proven to be the most prominent (and therefore most controversial) tool for the ad 
hoc Tribunals in identifying customary law.101 This source of law is a complex and vast 
concept, closely related to and constantly overlapping with other sources of law, particularly 
with custom. According to Degan, the general principles of law can be understood in two 
meanings.  In their broad sense, as a basis of any legal order, they form a unity with the two 
other main sources, customary law and treaties. In their narrow sense, they are seen as a tool 
for international judges to fill in gaps of positive law when there is no suitable treaty or 
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customary rule to apply.102 Although the principle of legality sets strict limits to the gab-
filling function of general principles in respect of the definitions of crimes, these principles 
can still be used for excluding criminal responsibility for instance.103 
In the context of ICL, custom has aroused a considerable amount of debate and disagreement. 
As ICL is a mix up of different legal systems there prevails no unanimity over the nature and 
status of customary norms. The common law and civil law systems, for instance, have truly 
differing stances on unwritten laws. In ICL, the big debate circles around the application of 
the principle of legality in international law. The main issues are related to legal certainty and 
foreseeability, which are profound requirements of any criminal justices system. The initial 
question is whether customary law can provide basis for individual criminal responsibility. 
This is because the principle of legality requires that crimes are to be defined with certain 
amount of detail and customary law is, in the absence of written rules, inherently 
indeterminate. It seems that the whole concept of custom remains vague as its content cannot 
be determined exhaustively. Notwithstanding that some authors still question the 
appropriateness of customary law for providing criminal liability, judicial praxis from the 
Nuremberg trials onward has shown that international crimes can and do emerge through 
customary international law.104 
However, one should be aware of the criticism directed towards the vagueness of customary 
law. Degan, for instance, argues that the principle of legality prohibits criminalization that is 
based solely on customary international law. Hence, the statutes of international criminal 
courts should provide all the definitions of crimes beforehand and in written form, as the 
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Rome Statute largely does.105 Eventually, this criticism leads us to the question of how the 
principle of legality should be understood in international law. Degan’s perception of this 
principle is strictly positivistic (nullum crimen sine praevia lege scripta), a view that is 
followed typically in civil law countries. As it is often argued, the version of the principle of 
legality applied in international criminal proceedings seems to be more relaxed than what is 
meant by Degan.106 Even though I argue later in this work that the application of ICL is 
heading towards stricter legality, it is by no means necessary, in my opinion, to base 
criminalization of international crimes solely on written texts. 
The distinctive character of the principle of legality in international law is mainly caused by 
the contradictory nature of international criminal proceedings. As they are usually set out 
during or after devastating events of widespread human injustice, such as genocide, they must 
balance between the aims of justice and peace.107  In addition, one cannot assimilate the 
horizontal lawmaking process of the international legal system to a national one. The fact that 
some international rules are written does not add any particular authority to them. As there is 
no legislative authority at international level there are no written laws in their actual meaning. 
Furthermore, associating criminal responsibility to unwritten rules is due that customary law 
has wider reach than treaties, since treaties eventually bind only the parties. Customary law is 
most likely to retain its position as a general source of ICL since it is able to provide a rather 
comprehensive set of international norms which are compelling to all States and individuals. 
Although some skepticism is directed against the binding nature of customary law, several 
scholars argue that the core crimes have attained a status of jus cogens under customary law 
so that even the persistent objector doctrine does not allow State officials to escape 
accountability.108 
Degan also criticizes the general character that has been given to customary law in the 
jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals. 109 There is some truth in this. It is remarkable how the 
ICTY has sometimes used all the sources of international law in a mixture to prove the 
existence of customary law norms. In Hadžihasanović , for example, the Court constructed its 
findings on treaties, general principles of law, and judicial decisions, concluding that they 
altogether establish the existence of a customary rule providing command responsibility in 
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internal armed conflicts. 110  The Rome Statute does not offer any better solution to this 
indeterminacy as it states that the Court shall apply, in the second place and besides treaties, 
“principles and rules of international law”. Although general principles are codified 
separately in Part 3 of the Rome Statute, the wording of this provision reflects the reluctance 
of the drafters to address the inconsistency prevailing over the unwritten sources of 
international law as it does not clearly indicate that the court is able to apply customary law, 
but merely “rules of international law”. As noted above, Degan argues that this provision may 
relieve judges from the task of proving the customary character of newly discovered rules.111 
The generality surrounding customary law is overwhelming. As there is no common 
agreement on its content, it may be utilized to provide interpretations of law that cannot be 
supported by strong legal arguments. Customary law is constantly overlapping with other 
sources of international law. Due to this constant interaction, one cannot always clearly 
distinguish between custom and other sources of law.112 Therefore, it may be easy for a judge 
to provide an explanation that international law “in general” supports the existence of a given 
rule without actually identifying which sources and to what extent support this finding. Given 
the demands of the principle of legality, this is a profound shortcoming in criminal 
proceedings. Future challenge for international criminal judges is to distinguish clearly 
between customary law, general principles of law, and judicial decisions if they are to be held 
as separated sources of international law, as stated in the ICJ statute. 
3.2 The Interplay of Customary Law and Judicial Decisions 
In public international law, the decisions of international courts, such as those of the ICJ, 
have usually “no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular 
case”.113 Moreover, judicial decisions are only subsidiary means for the determination of 
international rules.114 The word “subsidiary” indicates that courts do not actually make law 
but they should apply existing law.115 
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Thus, the primary function of courts in general is to apply law, not to make it. Article 59 of 
the ICJ Statute that limits the effects of the Court’s decisions in respect of future cases 
expresses the idea that the Court should not be considered as a law-making institution. In 
practice, however, the ICJ has given precedential value to its own decisions, and one can 
certainly notice a desire for consistency in the Court’s jurisprudence.116 Moreover, the Court 
has adopted a role of an authoritative interpreter of international law and its decisions are 
regarded highly authoritative by States, other international courts, and international 
organizations.117 Thus in reality, the ICJ plays a major role in contemporary law-making 
since it is a leading authority to deliver opinions and issue statements upon the current state 
of public international law.118 This results from the decentralized system of international law. 
In the absence of a legislative body a majority of its rules are unwritten and judicial decisions 
play a major role in discovering and establishing these rules.119  
In ICL, judicial decisions have played even more prominent role in defining the substance of 
law. For instance, during the establishment of the ICTY the UN Secretary-General referred to 
the case law of the Nuremberg Tribunal in order to determine crimes that were “beyond any 
doubt part of customary law”,120 a statement that was later approved by the Security Council. 
This can be regarded as a confirmation that the case law of international criminal courts can 
be treated as an element of practice defining customary law.121 
The subsidiary status of judicial decisions does not appear to be sustained by the UN 
Tribunals. Even though the ad hoc Tribunals do not follow the stare decisis doctrine, they 
regard the rulings of their common Appeals Chamber as authoritative.122  The SCSL Statute 
also contains a provision according to which “[t]he judges of the Appeals Chamber of the 
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Special Court shall be guided by the decisions of the Appeals Chamber of the International 
Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda.”123 
The Tribunals have also cited rulings of other international courts, such as the ECtHR and 
IMT, as well as national constitutional courts, such as the House of Lords, the Supreme 
Courts of Canada and the United States and the French Conseil constitutionnel.124 According 
to Schabas, the Tribunals have, however, referred to these rulings “in the parameters of 
article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, using the decisions not as 
binding precedent but as persuasive and compelling authorities, deserving of serious 
consideration.”125 However it may be, the fact that the UN Tribunals tend to follow their own 
previous decisions imply that the distinction between the three main sources and subsidiary 
means in the ICJ Statute is not that clear in the context of ICL.126 Even the Rome Statute 
mandates the ICC to “apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous 
decisions”.127  This has led some scholar to argue that a weak form of stare decisis has 
actually developed within ICL.128 
Nevertheless, the tendency of courts to follow previous judicial decisions as evidencing the 
content of customary law should be distinguished from courts’ actual ability to create law. 
Customary law is traditionally deemed to form through consistent practice of States, not 
courts. The fact that customary law is nowadays often associated with the case law of 
international courts is because the disputes over the existence of certain customary rules are 
usually solved in international proceedings. In addition, it is not unusual that States disobey 
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rules of international law without actually aspiring to change the content of law. Such 
behavior is typical during wartime for instance. Thus the ascertainment of a consistent State 
practice is associated with some major difficulties within areas such as humanitarian law, 
human rights law, and ICL.129 Because of this, customary rules of ICL are often drawn from 
previous judicial decisions (and treaties).130 But this does not mean that international judges 
are allowed to legislate from the bench per se.  
In the context of ICL customary law system resembles those national common law justice 
systems that still include unwritten common law offences. Yet it is important to make a 
distinction between the legislative activity practiced by the common law courts (often 
referred as “judge-made law”) and the use of judicial decisions in the customary law-making 
process. 131 The difference is that customary norms are not made per se; they form through a 
consistent State practice supported by a common belief that such practice amounts to law and 
is binding on all (opinio juris). In contrast, the common law justice system builds up on stare 
decisis doctrine with huge amounts of judicial precedents and a hierarchical structure of 
courts.132 In international law such a doctrine does not exist, at least not to the same extent as 
in common law tradition.133 Thus, in common law tradition judicial precedents are binding, 
whereas in ICL they serve merely as assistance in determining if a given customary rule has 
crystallized into law. Furthermore, the international law-making process is horizontal with no 
compelling authority. This is why some authors emphasize the distinction between so called 
“judge-made law” and customary international law.134 
However, in ICL the relationship between judicial decisions and customary law is a rather 
obscure one. Usually judicial decisions work as declarations of existing customary law but in 
some cases they may have a crystallizing effect on customary rules. In the latter situations, 
                                               
129
 These difficulties are appraised more closely in chapter 6. 
130
 Heikkilä 2011, p. 920. 
131
 Indeed, Degan emphasizes the differences between “judge-made law” and customary law by stating that the 
two have nothing in common. Degan 2005, pp. 67, 73-75. 
132
 As a matter of stare decisis, the judges in common law countries are usually obliged to follow (the ratio 
decidendi of) former judicial precedents. In common law justice system there is a clear hierarchy between 
judicial organs, and only the final decisions of the highest courts are binding precedents. It is inherent to the 
system that judges are able to create new offences on the basis of the stare decisis doctrine. However, 
apparently even the courts of the English and US common law traditions no longer maintain the power to create 
new criminal offences in judicial proceedings. Ashworth 2009, p. 59; Van Schaack 2008.  
133
 The fact that judicial decisions are referred only as subsidiary means in the ICJ Statute implies in itself that 
the rule of stare decisis does not exist in international law. In addition, article 59 of the ICJ Statute clearly says 
that decisions of the Court are not to be held as binding precedents. However, some authors, such as Akande for 
instance, argue that the ad hoc Tribunals do apply this principle. Akande 2009, p. 53; For dissenting opinions 
see Nollkaemper 2003, p. 291;  Degan 2005, p. 76; Schabas 2010, pp. 394-397; Mettraux 2005, pp. 19-20.  
134
 See, e.g., Degan 2005, pp. 67, 73-75. 
24 
 
judicial decisions themselves become part of the customary law-making process. But even in 
these cases the customary status of a given rule results not from the fact that the rule is 
originated by a court but from the proof of evidence that the court has provided.135 
According to Degan, judges of the ad hoc Tribunals have frequently confused judicial 
decisions with customary law. Instead of referring to the basic elements of custom (State 
practice and opinio juris) judges have relied on judicial decisions using them as the sole 
evidence of customary law.136 Thus, the judges have combined these two sources with each 
other by referring to judicial decisions as “customary law”.137 It is unlikely that they have 
meant to do this. The used articulation in general still implies that judicial decisions are 
deemed to form only a part of the identifying process. However, regarding judicial decisions 
only as “subsidiary means” understates their prominence in ICL. Some scholars argue that the 
ad hoc Tribunals’ way to use supplementary sources, both judicial decisions and academic 
writings, has elevated these to the status of primary sources. 138  Indeed, international 
precedents from Nuremberg onward “have been a primary, if not the primary, source” of ICL, 
as Gallant concludes.139 Having said this, it is important to acknowledge that the practice of 
the Tribunals has aroused lots of criticism since several authors see that the methods being 
used have not been very plausible in their selectivity and inconsistency.140 
Former judicial decisions are still deemed to evidence either existing State practice or opinio 
juris to some extent, but they are not customary law ipso facto. Occasionally, they may play a 
major role in the formation of new customary rules, but the basic elements (practice and 
opinio) are still vital parts of custom and need to be established. However, when there is only 
a small amount of State practice to discover, the decisions of international courts gain more 
importance. Thus, the borderline between judicial decisions and customary law remains 
rather unclear. But care must be taken, especially in respect of criminal proceedings. As 
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Degan reminds us, the legislative process is inappropriate for criminal proceedings since it 
contains a risk of retroactive punishing.141 
4. Recasting the Sources of International (Criminal) Law? 
 
The increasing number of international courts has resulted in a situation where multiple 
institutions are interpreting how international law derives from the authoritative list of 
sources of article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute. Their various perceptions on the matter are bound 
to cause confusion regarding the understanding of the sources of international law. The ad 
hoc Tribunals have certainly done their share in this respect.142 In addition, the sphere of ICL 
contains an another list of sources, the Rome Statute, that serves as an alternative to the ICJ 
Statute. However, since the Rome Statute is not binding on courts other than the ICC it offers 
no solution to the uncertainty prevailing over the sources of ICL. Instead, it could be 
perceived as causing some fragmentation of international law. Yet, for the most part, the 
sources of ICL are the same as those in other areas of international law –what differs is the 
respective emphasis and essential differences between various courts: while the ICC largely 
resorts to written law the UN Tribunals have operated almost entirely with customary law. In 
this respect the Rome Statute seems like a critical response to the custom-embracing practice 
of the former tribunals. But as noted above, even the ICC may have to refer to customary law 
in its jurisprudence. 
The ad hoc Tribunals have elevated the normative status of international judicial decisions as 
a source of international law. The Tribunals have done this in two ways. On one hand, they 
have used former judicial decisions as strong evidence in identifying and discovering 
customary rules of ICL. On the other, they have themselves participated in forming these 
rules. As Boyle and Chinkin phrase it, all of the three tasks of an international court –
determining applicable law, applying it, and interpreting it– “assume existing law to be 
applied but in fact contribute to the process of law-making.”143 Like the ad hoc Tribunals, the 
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ICC embraces the value of judicial decisions as the Rome Statute allows it to follow “the 
principles and rules of law interpreted in its previous decisions.”144 However, its reliance on 
the jurisprudence of other courts has been modest. 
The initial reason for the higher status of customary law and judicial decision in ICL lies in 
the emergence of individual criminal liability in international law. After the WWII it was 
clear that individuals should be held liable for their atrocities.145 Nevertheless, States failed to 
enact penal codes that could apply in international proceedings. Thus, the majority of the 
fundamental legislation of ICL is taken from treaties that were made to regulate State conduct. 
Although States created these rules which constitute the fundamentals of ICL, it was only the 
work of international criminal courts that enabled their direct applicability in actual 
prosecutions. This has happened via customary law. The work of developing the content of 
ICL that started in the Nuremberg IMT continued after the Cold War in the ad hoc Tribunals. 
Although one may conclude that the ad hoc Tribunals have recast the understanding of the 
sources of international law within ICL to some extent, it is important to notice that as they 
are ending their work the ICC is likely to lead the way towards more conventional ICL. 
However, the status and importance of customary law still remains since ICL, or any other 
branch of international law, cannot operate fully on conventional law. What can be said is 
that one should not blindly follow the sources as enumerated in the ICJ Statute but 
acknowledge the changing nature of international law. Its sources have the ability to adapt to 
changing circumstances in which the law is applied, depending on the substance and aims of 
the law as well as the institutions applying it. 
                                                                                                                                                  
methods that are used to identify these norms. Indeed, judicial decisions can both represent a newly formed rule 
of customary law and also provide the process for creating one. This perspective is addressed more closely in 
the next section of this work. 
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PART II 
THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS IN TODAY’S 
CUSTOMARY LAW-MAKING PROCESS 
 
 
If large numbers of people believe in freedom of speech, there will 
be freedom of speech even if the law forbids it. But if public 
opinion is sluggish, inconvenient minorities will be persecuted, 
even if laws exist to protect them. 
          -George Orwell 
 
5. Custom: Traditional and Modern Approaches 
 
There seems to be no agreement on how much State practice is needed to form new norms of 
customary law. Two competing schools can be observed on this matter.  They are usually 
termed as traditional and modern approaches. Both theories rely on two elements, State 
practice and opinio juris. These elements are both necessary and they are closely intertwined. 
To identify opinio juris one must draw on States’ behavior to make presumptions about their 
common will. To identify relevant State practice one must refer to opinio juris since only acts 
which express the common will of States are counted. Thus, State practice is defined by 
opinio juris and vice versa.146  
Several sources can be used to evidence a consistent State practice as well as opinio juris. 
These include diplomatic statements, executive practices, domestic legislation, judicial 
decisions, etc. According to the traditional doctrine, general recognition by most States (or 
relevant States) is sufficient to confirm a customary rule which is binding on all States. This 
concerns also States that have not explicitly given their consent to the rule, unless they 
                                               
146
 Koskenniemi 2005, p. 411. In addition, resorting solely on material practice does not make law normative. 
Normativity comes from the fact that States in general believe some norm to be binding on all and that 
deviations are not acceptable. However, to avoid utopianism, a normative custom must be ascertained by 
recourse to material acts. As a solution, law-creating material practice is deemed to reflect States’ wills and 
beliefs. But there is no general rule to say which acts are custom-forming and which are not. In order to identify 
relevant practice one must inquire the wills and beliefs behind certain acts. See ibid. pp. 410-438. In fact, 
Koskenniemi argues that this circularity of the two elements of custom “prevents doctrine from developing a 
determinate method of custom-ascertainment.” Ibid. p. 411. See also pp. 437-438. 
28 
 
qualify as persistent objectors. However, even persistent objectors are bound by peremptory 
norms of customary law, jus cogens.147 
The main difference between the traditional and modern approaches is how they emphasize 
State practice and opinio juris in the formation of customary norms. The traditional approach 
stresses the State practice element. According to this approach, new customary norms 
crystallize from patterns of State behavior.  The modern scholars stress the opinion juris and 
see that new customary norms derive eventually from tacit agreements.148 In reality, however, 
today’s customary law seems to be a mix up of both approaches.149 In fact, several authors 
have taken an approach that reconciles between these two theories.150 
Prominent is that through customary law the progressive development of ICL, international 
humanitarian law, and international human rights law can be made possible. Indeed, what is 
remarkable about custom is that nowadays it is increasingly being used as a progressive 
source of law. Particularly in the field of human rights and humanitarian law, the need to 
provide a just world order has led to a utilitarian use of the customary law-making process.151 
The means being used to ascertain new customary rules have varied considerably and the 
whole concept of customary law has chanced due to a number of re-interpretations.152 
Although there is no one method of identifying customary law, it is unanimously accepted 
that the formation of new customary norms does not require explicit consent from each 
independent State. What is needed is a general and consistent pattern of State behavior. 153 
Thus, States can be bound by a new customary norm if they were simply inactive at the time 
it was created. However, the persistent objector rule allows States to opt out of a particular 
customary norm by simply objecting the rule during the phase of its formation.154 
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5.1 Traditional Approach  
Traditionally, new customary rules emerged through an extensive, uniform, and consistent 
State practice. In this law-making process opinio juris had merely an evidentiary role 
supporting the newly formed praxis. In other words, deeds had priority over words. 
Sometimes customary rules were even deemed to emerge from State practice alone. This 
made the job for international courts easier since they had to rely mainly on States’ behavior 
in order to ensure new customary rules.155 Thus, the traditional approach beholds custom as 
an inductive process in which customary patterns are searched from States’ behavior in order 
to create new customary rules.156 Traditional custom can be characterized as an evolutionary 
(rather than innovative) process since it tends to look in the past and recognize a uniform 
pattern of State behavior. It is far from being a progressive source of law since it changes 
rather slowly and requires large amount of evidence in order to prove new customary rules. 
However, proving the existence of a consistent State practice is a problematic task. It is 
unclear what kind of behavior can be counted as legitimate State practice for the purpose of 
identifying custom. For example, it is not clear what role should treaties or GA resolutions 
play in this respect.157 Some scholars argue that only acts (but not statements) should be 
counted as practice while others welcome all sort of behavior in this regard. Even if this can 
be solved, it can be rather difficult to identify relevant practice among all State behavior in an 
objective manner. Moreover, as Koskenniemi has pointed out, same body of State practice 
can be used to prove completely opposite customary norms.158 This is where the “exception 
confirms the rule” idiom applies. In order to identify a rule, one must point out what can be 
regarded as an exception of that rule. However, at certain point when the number of 
exceptions increases high enough the rule in question loses its customary status or changes. 
Indeed, what comes to customary international law, an essential method of law-making is 
law-breaking.  
As noted, State practice without opinio juris is not enough to determine the existence of a 
customary norm.159 The latter differentiates voluntary practice from that what is required by 
law. However, identifying opinio juris can be even more complicated than State practice 
since there is no certainty about the sources of evidence for opinio juris either. For example, 
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it is not clear how diplomatic correspondence, national and international judicial decisions, 
bilateral and multilateral treaties, and GA resolutions are to be weighted (if they can be 
counted as legitimate sources at all) when proving the existence of opinio juris.160 Moreover, 
are no methods for measuring the normative attitudes of States.  
In the end, time appears to be the most problematic concept in custom-formation. The 
duration of State practice is used to distinguish custom from mere usage. However, this 
makes custom a slow and cumbersome source of law that is unable to response rapidly to 
changing circumstances. In the field of international criminal justice this is a profound 
shortcoming. As we have seen from the Nuremberg trials onward the enterprise of 
international criminal justice is in need of a customary law that is responsive to social 
changes. But even though a slow process of custom formation seems obsolete, it is more 
normative than a rapid one. The faster and flexible the process becomes the more it loses its 
normativity as it becomes unpredictable, an instrument of politics.161 
5.2 Modern Approach 
Already in the 1980s Simma and Alston wrote that the inductive process of identifying 
custom is be replaced by a new “broad-based” approach of ascertaining customary law. There 
exist several examples of this. Particularly in the field of human rights law, obligations upon 
States are usually deemed to derive from customary international law. Simma and Alston 
point out that the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example, has always been 
largely regarded as customary law. 162  This is understandable, since less than 60 States 
participated in drafting the Declaration. The recognition of its substance as customary law 
obligations, and further obligations erga omnes, has removed this unpleasant obstacle. Indeed, 
human rights lawyers have often been characterized as wishful thinkers. However, different 
approaches can be noticed. Against this broad-based view there are stricter views, denying 
the legally binding force of the Declaration.163 
Then, what is this so called broad-based, or more familiarly known as modernized, customary 
law-making process? First of all, modern customary law has granted a new kind of normative 
power to non-State actors. International organizations, including international courts and 
                                               
160
 Lepard 2010, pp. 30-33. 
161
 On the requirements of normativity and concreteness of law, see Koskenniemi 2005, pp. 17-22. 
162
 For several examples of opinions in favor, see Simma & Alston 1989, pp. 90-92. 
163
 Id., pp. 84-85. 
31 
 
tribunals, now participate in the customary law-making process along with States. 164 
Particularly in the field of human rights law, today’s customary law is no longer made by 
States but by “publicists, NGOs, and other internationalist elite groups”. Estreicher argues 
that the change from “state-centered, bottom-up process” to a “policy/entrepreneur-centered, 
centralized practice” has been so dramatic that the process has lost its whole legitimacy.165 
Although today’s trend is that States are losing part of their sovereignty to other actors on the 
international stage, they are still the major lawmakers of international law.166 It is not that 
some supranational institutions would be expropriating States’ competences but rather that 
States are delegating their decision-making authority to these entities. Moreover, these 
institutions are operating within the limits that States have agreed to grant them.  Indeed, it is 
the States that have created these international organizations and equipped them with their 
competences and powers. Thus, the limitation of States’ sovereignty is mostly caused by their 
own decisions to delegate their powers to other entities. Therefore the possible ability of 
these entities to create new international law depends on the approval of the States.167  
Secondly, today’s customary law-making process has become faster. Often there is no time to 
wait for the new rules of customary law to achieve their full maturity through consistent and 
uniform State practice. What has become relevant in evidencing custom is the approval of 
States, not their uniform practice. The focus is on the consent and this can easily be reached 
through some international panel, General Assembly for example. The State practice has lost 
its constitutive role due to its slow and cumbersome nature. Another way of looking it is to 
say that the concept of State practice itself has changed from a real life practice into “paper 
practice”, as Simma and Alston characterize.168 Paradoxically, the custom in customary law is 
sometimes deemed almost meaningless. 
Interestingly, international entities appear to be more and more aware about their ability to 
create custom. Their behavior resembles more an intention to make law rather than obedience 
to obey existing obligations. This way, States are looking into the future, not acting according 
to existing law but according to what it should be. The same applies to international courts. 
Instead of looking back on what the actual custom has been, today’s judges tend to look 
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forward on how it is to change. 169  Because of these changes, the whole process of 
ascertaining customary rules has transformed. It has turned from a retrospective and inductive 
reasoning to a progressive and deductive process. The affirmation of new customary rules 
starts easily with declarations of States’ consent, and this may even suffice itself to fulfill the 
demands of the new law-making process. How the States actually behave is irrelevant. This 
has turned the process on its head since it starts to build up on general statements of desirable 
rules rather than already existing ones. 170 
In the words of Simma and Alston, customary law is suffering from a “profound identity 
crisis”. Not only is the emphasis taken away from State practice in favor of opinio juris but 
the latter element is counted twice. According to their view, evidence accepted to fulfill the 
State practice element is something else than actual State behavior. The evidence of opinio 
juris, i.e., the articulation of a given rule, has a tendency to fulfill both elements.171 
Regardless of all the criticism, some authors find no problem with the progressive way of 
forming new customary rules.172 Indeed, the modern approach is more flexible and rapid way 
to meet the challenges of the time. Condorelli, for instance, argues that customary law-
making can happen in a very short time frame if the evidence in favor emerges 
synchronically rather than in a long time period.173 However, this is the point where scholars 
often disagree. Is the suddenly emerged evidence enough to form a new customary rule or 
does it need a long-lasting and consistent State practice beside it? Furthermore, due to the 
horizontal structure of international law, it is not clear who has the final word to declare what 
is counted as custom, although the ICJ has some authority in this respect. In its jurisprudence, 
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the ICJ has usually declared the importance of both of the two basic elements of custom when 
determining the existence of customary rules. However, it has often acted otherwise. Instead 
of evaluating on the practice of States the ICJ has highlighted factors that can be counted in 
the element of opinio juris.174 
As noted, the traditional method of identifying customary rules was set out by the ICJ in the 
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases.175 But the court has changed its stance in subsequent 
practice. A more modern approach was taken in Nicaragua, where general consistency ruled 
over state practice element.176 In the Nicaragua judgment the ICJ determined the existence of 
a new customary rule on the basis of certain soft law instruments (such as the consent of the 
parties on certain GA resolutions) even though the actual behavior of States proved otherwise. 
It is as if the judges had rationalized the inconsistencies between State practice and opinio 
juris through the idiom of “exception confirms the rule”. Accordingly, the rule in question 
was based primarily on opinio juris and the inconsistent practice was deemed as an exception 
of that rule.177  
The Nicaragua judgment marked the beginning of an era of modern custom. The 
identification process changed from inductive to deductive, opinio juris took an advantage 
over State practice, and non-State actors were welcomed to participate in the law-making 
process. In addition, the whole concept of practice seemed to change.178 In the next section, I 
analyze how this trend has gained ground in the field of ICL. 
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6. Modern Custom and International Criminal Law 
 
It seems that both of the basic elements of customary law are poorly defined and can be 
identified rather subjectively. Since some sources have been used to fulfill both the State 
practice and opinio juris elements, it appears to be impossible to categorize every single act 
or gesture to either one of these elements. If they are to be used as the elements of existing 
customary law, a clear method of identification should be developed. The contemporary mix-
up model of traditional and modern custom allows States to pick and choose on what 
behavior should be counted to support whatever norms they wish to pursue. 
But there is no single solution to the problem at hand. Whereas the traditional approach 
seems slow and cumbersome, the modern (instant) custom encases a danger of becoming 
mere politics. It is rather problematic if the formation of customary law does not require any 
State practice at all. Then it would be enough that relevant States establish their opinio juris 
by, for instance, voting on GA resolutions. Even though the ICJ has affirmed that GA 
resolutions have legal significance as evidencing customary international law they work as 
poor grounds when used as a sole basis for customary law norms.179 However, in the field of 
ICL the nature of custom may be slightly different since the interaction between States and 
other entities on the international stage does not derive from inter-State disputes but from a 
common will to pursue the aims of international criminal justice. As the direct addressees are 
not States but individuals and the acting (legislative, executive, or judicial) entity is (or 
should be) acting on behalf of the international community, the understanding of practice and 
opinio may differ from public international law. 
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6.1 Identifying Customary Law: From Inter-State to Community-Centered Law-
Making 
6.1.1 Defining State Practice 
The Nicaragua ruling has been criticized for that the new customary rule in question never 
had the time to crystallize through uniform and consistent practice; the inconsistencies 
between State practice and opinio juris existed right from the very beginning.180 Indeed, it 
seems a bit problematic to argue that the little practice at the formative stage actually 
represented an exception of a rule that in fact emerged at the same time.   However, when the 
customary rule in question concerns an abstention it is difficult to identify State practice 
supporting the rule since States do nothing when they abstain from breaking a rule. 181 
In international human rights and humanitarian law this is typical. Regardless of frequent 
violations of basic human rights and humanitarian law obligations, no one denies them to be 
binding on all States. These obligations are usually based on several sources, such as 
customary and conventional law, general principles of law, and even on some soft law 
instruments. In practice, however, their binding nature emerges simply from the fact that no 
one actually denies it since the existence of even frequent violations may not be sufficient 
enough to destroy the customary rule of abstention. 182  In this regard, utopia emerging 
dominant over apology is evident.183 
In general, no rule would certainly exist without exceptions. If all customary rules demanded 
universally consistent State behavior, this would not only diminish the effectiveness of 
custom but also lose the sole purpose of it. As Meron notes, customary rules demand some 
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sort of a balance between support and objection. 184  The wide spread of human rights 
doctrines together with the fact that individuals have entered as new actors on the 
international scene have changed the nature of international law to a more human rights-
oriented. As Iovane writes: “We are witnessing a crucial shift from classical international law, 
whose only purpose is the protection of a state’s governmental power and the delimitation of 
this power vis-à-vis other states, towards the protection of human rights and fundamental 
liberties.”185 
Some have argued that customary international law may not form the best basis to explain the 
universally binding nature of human rights obligations. First of all, States’ actual behavior 
often demotes rather than promotes these obligations. As noted above, this usually results 
from the prohibitive nature of these obligations. Some authors see that  this is likely diminish 
the importance of State practice so that it becomes almost meaningless.186 Secondly, in the 
field of human rights law, there is no constant interaction between States, which is intrinsic 
and essential to the State practice element. Since human rights violations are usually carried 
out by States towards their own citizens, these violations do not often arouse instant reactions 
from other States.187 
Particularly in the field of humanitarian law, where inter-State practice is extremely difficult 
to identify, the role of other actors has become more crucial. As noted in chapter 3, it is not 
unusual that during wartime States disobey rules of international law without actually 
aspiring to change the content of law. Thus, the formation of consistent practice “does not 
require a worldwide armed conflict in which all States should apply these rules in their 
mutual relations.”188 In addition, the ICTY has noted that since the actual behavior of troops 
is out of judicial sight in wartime, “reliance must primarily be placed on such elements as 
official pronouncements of States, military manuals and judicial decisions.”189 By applying 
humanitarian law in their jurisprudence the ad hoc Tribunals have showed that even if this 
field of law is repeatedly violated in wartime it does not cease to exist.190   
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This lack of inter-State interaction is inherent to ICL as well. 191 As Lee points out, the core 
crimes usually concern atrocities committed by State officials on the State’s own territory and 
against the State’s own citizens.192  Interfering to this kind of activity does not (usually) 
contain any interests between States per se but is a matter of maintaining peace and security, 
protecting the innocents, ensuring their human rights, and in the end, punishing the violators 
of the most fundamental values of the international community. Indeed, carrying out an actio 
popularis by prosecuting persons who are hostes humani generis (whether in domestic or 
international courts) entails usually no obligations between States. Therefore, there is no need 
for other States to react.193 
Thus, it can be argued that the “element of interaction” is not vital for customary law to 
develop in certain fields of international law, such as ICL. The practice that creates custom in 
ICL constitutes largely out of judicial practice, particularly international courts practice. As 
van den Herik points out, the distinctive nature of ICL should be taken into account. 
International criminal courts are established for the very reasons that domestic courts have 
failed to punish the perpetrators of international crimes.194  Given this, the actual “State 
practice” concerning ICL is not always found from national court decisions, but on the 
international stage instead. 
To conclude, the substance of ICL requires different kind of methods of identifying custom. 
There are good reasons for this. First of all, traditional methods of identifying State practice 
were originated at the time when the true rise of human rights obligations –not to mention 
individual accountability– in international law was yet to come.  Those methods were no 
doubt suitable for solving disputes between States but they were simply not made to identify 
fundamental rules of international law that derive from the common will of the international 
community, rules of such a fundamental gravity that even their repeated violation would not 
lead to their decease.   
As with international human rights and humanitarian law, in ICL the lack of inter-State 
interaction causes that the traditional methods of identifying State practice are not workable.  
In some cases it is impossible to identify actual State practice in its original meaning. Then it 
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is important to search for the evidence of (State) practice elsewhere, not to focus on 
observing States’ external behavior. In addition, the whole nature of a customary rule is 
different when the issue is not an obligation between States but a prohibition that concerns 
individuals also. In the latter situation, it may not be useful to identify State practice that 
often violates these rules. Therefore, the common will, i.e., opinio juris, often becomes 
decisive.195  
Thus, the distinctive nature of ICL poses challenges for the customary law-making process, 
changing it into a more institution-centered, modernized source of law. The question is to 
which institutions the law-making power can be delegated. In today’s practice, the elements 
of State practice and opinio juris are often fulfilled with judicial precedents of international 
criminal courts. In further sections it is appraised whether international criminal courts are 
legitimate institutions to develop customary international law. 
6.1.2 Defining Opinio Juris 
Defining opinio juris is a complicated task since it can be understood in two meanings. It 
may either resemble States’ belief that something is law (lex lata) or States’ will that 
something should be law (lex ferenda). The declaratory and constitutive approaches argue 
whether opinio resembles an opinion that something already is law and thus does not 
participate in the creation process (declaratory theory) or whether it actually creates custom 
being the direct cause of custom’s obligatory character (constitutive theory).196  
In practice, opinio juris is used to fulfill both tasks at the same time.197 For instance, in 
Nicaragua, the ICJ argued that the customary rule of non-intervention emerged through 
certain GA resolutions since they reflected the “attitude” of States. However, the Court did 
not clarify whether this actually was the will or belief of States.198 In spite of the clear 
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contradiction between will and knowledge, opinio juris of arising customary law tries to build 
on both of them.  
Somewhat as a compromise, custom can be explained as a process during which opinio 
transforms from will (opinio necessitatis) into knowledge (opinio juris). However, it is hard 
to argue how this happens and in exactly which point the “ought” turns to “is”. Opinio surely 
cannot include both at the same time. It is absurd to think something as a binding rule and 
simultaneously as an expression of the subjective will of what ought to be one.  In this case 
the borderline between lex lata and lex ferenda would be completely vanished.199 
Therefore, an apparent paradox always inheres in opinio juris. The formation of opinio for 
new rules of customary law requires States to believe that they are legally bound to obey a 
rule that does not yet exist. Thus, the belief of States must be initially incorrect.200 This 
paradox remains as contemporary theories fail to provide a solution to the problem between 
present and future. Regardless of this, customary international law continues to develop. The 
fundamental questions behind the process are something that we just have to live with, or at 
least they go beyond this paper.201  
At this point it would be easiest to conclude that in the absence of international legislator ICL 
is nothing more than politics. But this destroys the fundamental aspect of ICL, legality. To 
believe in the enterprise of international criminal justice is to believe in the rule of law. This 
means that the judicial authority, at least, must take more positivistic approach on the matter 
and separate law from politics and subjective wills of States by believing in its objective 
character. As Koskenniemi puts it, if we believe international law to be law, we must assume 
that these two aspects are to be separated: “States must be assumed capable of leading a 
schizophrenic existence- being legislators in a “private”, subjective capacity and judges in a 
“public”, objective one.”202 On the face of it, international courts should adopt the latter role, 
but identifying the common will of States in our world of disagreement is not always an easy 
task to accomplish. What happens when opinio cannot be clearly established and there are no 
rules for the courts to apply? 
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As many of the ICL proceedings have taken place in international courts, international judges 
have inevitably participated in interpreting the opinio juris element. Likewise with States, 
international courts have played a bilateral role in this respect. This is because States have 
failed to enact comprehensive ICL for the courts to apply. As noted above, international law 
has originally been designed to be an instrument for governing relations between States, so 
most of the treaty provisions embodying international prohibitions were never made to be 
applied directly in international prosecutions. However, international courts have used these 
prohibitions via customary law as a basis for individual criminal liability and thus engaged in 
developing the law within their own jurisdictions. Therefore, international criminal courts 
have not merely contented themselves with passive application of international law but they 
have worked as quasi-legislators in deciding that opinio juris favors their approach.  
Furthermore, as I point out in the following chapters, international criminal courts have 
resorted to the objectives of ICL and to the immorality of an act as interpretational methods 
when defining the core crimes and liability forms under customary international law. By 
doing this, they are not merely interpreting but representing the opinio juris element of 
custom in their judicial reasoning. Some scholars see no problem with this. As noted, the 
formation of ICL is more community-centered than public international law. Because States 
are always driven by their own interests, international judges turn out to be better authorities 
in representing the “moral condemnation of the international community”.203 
6.2 Can International Criminal Courts Make Law?  
6.2.1 Legitimacy Issue 
In this chapter I focus on the question whether courts in general are competent to serve as 
(quasi-) legislators on the international stage. The impartiality of a court and the separation of 
powers are crucial issues in this respect.  
The amount international criminal courts can contribute to the development of ICL depends 
upon the weight that is given to their rulings. These rulings become law only if States accept 
them and build their practice around them. A court is likely to be accepted to produce 
authoritative statements of law if it is found to be an impartial and legitimate institution that 
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follows the basic principles of law. Several factors affect the legitimacy of a court. Factors 
that enhance courts’ legitimacy are inter alia fair procedure and outcome, availability of 
appeal, a great number of judges participating in the decision-making, availability of court 
documents, judicial consistency and predictability (court’s reliance on its previous decisions), 
and impartiality of judges.204 
As noted, non-State actors have increasingly contributed to the making of international law. 
Indeed, today’s international law is increasingly made in international forums, meetings, and 
conventions.205  According to the modern view mentioned above, customary law can be made 
almost instantly through common acceptance, consensus. Thus, it is not always necessary to 
wait for an extensive, uniform, and consistent State practice. If the common will of the 
international community (opinio juris) is what matters, the next question is which entities are 
competent to express this. If the common will can be expressed by the Security Council or by 
a GA meeting (as in the Nicaragua case), can the formation of this common will be delegated 
to international courts as well?206 
At first, the difference between the actions of the Security Council and those of international 
courts must be emphasized. The acts of the Security Council –for example the establishment 
of the ad hoc Tribunals– are acts of an international organization. Since the Council operates 
by the votes of its members, its acts may even be regarded as State practice or opinio juris of 
those States.207 In any case, the acts of the Council are binding on all UN members. The acts 
of international courts are also acts of international organizations. For instance, the ad hoc 
Tribunals are acting as subsidiary organs of the Security Council.208 However, the acts of the 
Tribunals are independent of the wills of States (even though the Statutes of the ad hoc 
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Tribunals are binding on all member States by virtue of article 25 of the UN Charter) and 
thus do not represent either State practice or opinio juris per se.209  
Then, should international criminal courts be given the ability create law? One argument in 
favor is that the rules made by international judges, rather than national policymakers, may be 
fairer. States and their diplomats are usually engaged in multilateral negotiations seeking to 
drive their own interests at first hand. Nowadays strong and powerful States benefit most 
from customary law since they are able to force smaller States to play with their rules.210 As 
judges should be impartial, they should also have an objective standpoint to create new 
regulations. Their “objectiveness” may be even more pure than what can be obtained in the 
UN decision-making.211 The biggest advantage in judges’ contribution to the development of 
ICL would be that it may reduce the political influence of powerful States. Even though this 
may be more apparent in public international law where States settle their disputes in 
international courts, the existence of political power play is very real in ICL also. 
Unfortunately, even international criminal courts have not managed to escape from this.212 
However, they enjoy considerably less freedom than other institutions in the international 
law-making process. 
On a theoretical basis, if an international criminal court carries out an actio popularis by 
prosecuting persons who are hostis humani generis, can it be said that it acted on behalf of 
the entire international community, thus expressing opinio juris of all States? If so, the 
motive of the prosecution would be common, it would derive from the serious nature of the 
crime, and its sole purpose would be to enhance international justice by holding perpetrators 
of the core crimes accountable for their atrocities.213  
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This idea is hardly rejected. The very reason behind establishing these courts is found from 
their common purpose to carry out prosecutions that States are unable or unwilling to execute 
themselves. However, even if they can be seen as objective institutions that are able to 
express the common will of the international community the idea that courts could 
simultaneously use judicial and legislative powers is commonly objected. This is where the 
separation of powers becomes crucial. 
The Montesquieuan way of separating powers, usually adopted more clearly in civil law 
countries, is modeled for the governance of a State. This has not been carried out that 
explicitly in ICL since international criminal courts –quite similarly as courts in common law 
tradition– still possess some legislative power. However, it is commonly agreed that even in 
international law the substantive lawmaker may not be the same authority that carries out 
prosecutions or even establishes courts.214 For this reason it is awkward when international 
courts practice judicial creativity. 
Although international courts should not able to legislate per se, an element of law-making 
inheres always in the work of international courts. As the ECtHR has noted, application of 
even criminal law provisions involves an inevitable element of judicial interpretation.215 This 
results from to the indeterminacy of language. To clarify, some acts may be within the core of 
a crime definition and some clearly outside that definition, but no legislator can include all 
possible acts beforehand in it. Thus law, even criminal law (be it either statutory or case law), 
is always in need of interpretation. Moreover, in ICL where courts often apply customary 
rules of international law judges face new kinds of challenges since the inherent obscureness 
of customary law allows them to interpret the content of law more broadly. 
As mentioned, States are still the primary law-makers on the international stage. The fact that 
they delegate some law-making power to other entities does not deprive away their 
sovereignty or status as the primary law-makers.216 The area of criminal law is deeply rooted 
in the core of State sovereignty, whereupon States have their interests in sustaining wide 
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discretion in respect of the law-making process. Rulings of national criminal courts play also 
a major role in the development of ICL. However, national courts play with the rules of their 
own legal systems and their rulings must be evaluated in that context. Therefore, the rulings 
of international courts can be held as more prominent precedents. Now, if international 
criminal courts are able to create law to some extent, it is crucial to clarify how this happens 
in practice. 
6.2.2 How and Why Rulings of International Criminal Courts Become Binding 
Customary Law? 
In the end, the jurisprudence of international criminal courts is binding on States only insofar 
as they agree it to be or where it embodies precisely what customary international law is.217 
Thus, when judicial findings are not in line with contemporary rules of international law 
States’ subsequent approval becomes decisive. This is elucidated by the following examples. 
The Appeals Chamber’s decision in Tadić, declaring that the subject-matter jurisdiction of 
the ICTY extends to internal armed conflicts, is arguably the most well-known decision in the 
ICTY’s practice. This decision was subsequently endorsed by the ICTR, other ICTY courts, 
and drafters of the Rome Statute. 218 This is despite the criticism addressed to the methods 
used to ascertain the customary status of the rule in question.219 Today, the decision seems to 
represent the state of customary law. 
Not all the decisions made by the Appeals Chamber have achieved the status of customary 
law. For example, duress is acknowledged as a complete defense to a charge of murder as a 
crime against humanity or war crime in the Rome Statute even though the Appeals Chamber 
of the ICTY clearly rejected this in Erdemović.220 How is this so? Since the subject-matter 
jurisdiction of the ICTY is based on customary international law, does not this mean that all 
its final decisions (at least those defining substantive regulations of customary international 
law) should be taken as expressions of binding customary law? Unfortunately, the matter is 
not that simple. 
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In Erdemović, the Appeal Chamber denied the existence of a principle according to which 
duress is a complete defense against a charge of crimes against humanity or war crimes 
involving the killings of innocent persons. Erdemović was initially charged with one count of 
a crime against humanity or, alternatively, of a war crime.221 Having pleaded guilty to the 
first charge he was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment by the Trial Chamber for crime 
against humanity. The defense mounted an appeal pleading that the crime had been 
committed under duress. After surveying through a considerable amount of material the 
Appeals Chamber held that although there was a defense of duress in international law, it did 
not apply to crimes involving the killings of innocents.222 However, it found that duress can 
serve as a mitigating factor in sentencing. Erdemović was finally sentenced to five years’ 
imprisonment. 223 
Due the strongly dissenting opinions of Judges Cassese and Stephen, the finding was rather 
controversial.224 The dissenting opinions were subsequently favored by the drafters of the 
Rome Statute.225 Now that duress can be a complete defense under the Rome Statute one 
could conclude that customary international law has changed since the Erdemović ruling. 
Gallant explains this change in the law by the subsequent events of the Rwandan genocide, 
where a great number of Hutus participated in slaughtering Tutsis in fear that refusal would 
certainly have led to their own deaths.226 This point of view was not left unnoticed by Judge 
Cassese in Erdemović.227 
Prominent is that in both of these cases the ICTY’s decision has led to progressive 
development of ICL, but with reverse results. What has been decisive is the subsequent 
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approval of the international community.228 This can be manifested through various ways in 
these modern times. For instance, a Trial Chamber of ICTY has held that “the Rome Statute 
by and large may be taken as constituting an authoritative expression of the legal views of a 
great number of States.”229 The requirements of the defense of duress as laid down in the 
Rome Statute represent arguably customary international law.230 
In the end, the fact that some rules from the jurisprudence of international courts amount to 
customary international law does not depend on the fact that the rules in question are 
originated in an international court, but upon the quality of the judicial arguments stating that 
they represent customary law.231 Through plausible arguments the acceptance of States is 
easier to achieve, and occasionally it may even be unnecessary. Yet the subsequent 
endorsement of the Tadić decision reveals that an international norm that is found to be 
indispensable is also followed afterwards, no matter how weak its judicial basis may be at the 
time of its foundation. The bulk around the thin rule can be created afterwards through a wide 
acceptance and consistent practice. All this demonstrates that customary norms of ICL are 
often generated in a pragmatic process of lex ferenda, a process in which courts contribution 
is often indispensable. 
6.3 Conclusions 
Today, more and more customary rules are codified in international conventions.232  The 
controversial character of custom had led some authors to argue that the importance of 
custom as a source of law in general has diminished.233 However, conventional law on its 
own provides a rather unsatisfactory basis for universal obligations. Indeed, when it comes to 
human rights obligations one can observe a strong desire to turn to customary law in recent 
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decades. Customary law can supply a comprehensive set of international norms which are 
compelling to all States.234  
With respect to customary law-making, disobedience seems to be a fatal but vital element of 
the process. In order to change existing law States must act according to and believe in a rule 
that does not yet qualify as law. If the arising rule is in violation of existing ones this means 
that States have to disobey existing law to create new laws. This is bound to diminish the 
normativity of customary law since the creation of new rules requires States to ignore the 
binding character of the former ones. Custom is thus vulnerable to becoming mere “apology 
for State behavior”.235  In contrast, sometimes the process relies heavily on fundamental 
principles that are abstracted from actual State practice. This occurs in areas related to 
fundamental moral and ethical values, namely human rights and humanitarian law 
obligations.236 All this makes custom seem like a tool for purposeful and pragmatic law-
making, a process that does not clearly distinguish between lex lata and lex ferenda. 
This is evident in ICL. Whenever rapid developments of international law were needed, 
custom was the doctrine used. Throughout the history of ICL new rules of customary 
international law have emerged with exceptional rapidity. These developments have been 
necessary for the international community to respond to devastating events and satisfying 
demands of international justice at exceptional times. Revolutionary changes in customary 
law have led judges and scholars to justify them in various ways. Concepts such as “instant 
custom” or “Grotian Moment” emerged to explain the legitimacy of these changes.237 
The sudden changes are often associated with issues concerning the maintenance of 
international peace and security, human rights and humanitarian law obligations, and 
international criminal justice, all of which are closely related to fundamental values of the 
international community. Thus, it is not surprising that the developments have relied heavily 
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on utopian arguments rather than apologetic. This demonstrates the pragmaticalness of 
customary law. In the end, the contemporary qualification for a rule to be custom is that 
States generally consider it as “obligatory or right” under international law.238 
The view that substantive regulations created in today’s international criminal proceedings 
would become law henceforth may not be consistent with the traditional views of customary 
law-making. However, this idea is approved by the modern, instant, theory of custom. The 
modern approach is pragmatic and often more suitable for the demands of ICL since it is 
more compatible with the nature and purposes of ICL. 239 As noted by Meron, there is no 
inherent reason that the principle of legality requires the traditional approach.240 
Although judicial decisions are generally deemed to represent only subsidiary sources of 
international law, in ICL they have commandeered the process of custom formation. Since 
the Nuremberg trials, international criminal tribunals have been among the primary law-
makers of ICL.241 The rise of international courts as developers of ICL is a result of States –
still the supposed primary law-makers– failing to establish a comprehensive ICL for the 
courts to apply. Without the contribution of international courts the state of ICL would be 
vastly different. Yet one must remember that judicial decisions are not customary law per se, 
but work as singular (though crucial) factors in the process of custom formation. 
Finally, although international criminal courts participate in developing the customary rules 
of ICL to some extent, their work in the process is (or should be!) more restricted than courts 
working in other areas of international law. This is due to the principle of legality. By 
developing the content of ICL courts are not only treading on states’ toes but also violating 
the rights of individuals by expanding the scope of criminal liability. 
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7. Methods of Identifying Customary Law in the UN Tribunals 
 
As noted, crimes based on customary international law are to be reconciled with the principle 
of legality. In order to maintain its legitimacy, the identification process of customary law 
must be carried out using appropriate, i.e., coherent and predictable, methods. 242  When 
international criminal courts ignore the widely approved requirements of customary law they 
walk on thin ice and risk their credibility as the providers of international criminal justice and 
the rule of law. 
In contrast with the modern approach applied by the ICJ in its recent practice, Meron argues 
that international criminal tribunals, especially the ICTY, have taken a rather traditional and 
conservative approach in identifying and ascertaining existing customary norms. According 
to Meron, the ICTY chambers have firmly established the customary status of the crimes 
within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction by surveying intensely relevant State practice and opinio 
juris. In addition, the chambers have been reluctant to contribute to “an overly broad or rapid 
expansion of customary law offences”.243 Several scholars disagree with this point of view.244 
In the ad hoc Tribunals’ practice, the existence of customary norms of ICL is usually proved 
by referring to international legal praxis and/or conventional law.245 The ad hoc Tribunals 
have generally emphasized the importance of the traditional elements of customary law but 
the evidence of these elements has been gathered from various sources.246 
Occasionally, the Tribunals have recognized customary rules even without referring 
specifically to neither of these elements. In these cases the existence of customary rules is 
usually evidenced by resorting to general principles of law, previous judicial decisions, treaty 
provisions, and national laws. For instance, in the absence of relevant State practice, the 
Appeals Chamber has based its conclusions on such elements as “official pronouncements of 
States, military manuals and judicial decisions.”247 According to van den Herik, the evidence 
used by the ICTY to prove the existence of customary rules can be divided into two 
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categories, (1) national legislation and case law, and (2) international documents, including 
treaties.248  In addition, the ICTY has made several referrals to its earlier case law.249 As 
noted, the ICTY Appeals Chamber has approved the use of its previous decisions as 
statements of customary law. The following examples elucidate the methods used by the 
Tribunals. 
In the aforementioned Erdemović case judges of the ICTY had a major disagreement whether 
duress is a complete defense to the killing of innocent persons.250 The decision has been 
criticized subsequently for that it relied heavily on European war crime cases. In addition, 
Zahar and Sluiter emphasize that in general when surveying domestic legislation and judicial 
decisions the ad hoc Tribunals have only seldom referred to practice in the Russian 
Federation, India, China, Indonesia, South Africa, etc.251 
In Hadžihasanović, the Appeals Chamber considered whether the principle of command 
responsibility could be applied to internal conflicts under customary international law. The 
Chamber noted that showing the existence of State practice and opinio juris was 
indispensable in order to prove that this principle was part of customary international law.252 
Yet most States did not have this principle in their domestic legislation. According to the 
Chamber, this did not, however, establish whether States have accepted the principle at the 
international level, as a matter governed by customary international law. 253  Instead, the 
acceptance of States was proved by referring to decisions of the ICJ, including the Nicaragua 
case, in which common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions had been accepted as customary 
law. Citing the Tadić jurisdiction decision, the Chamber saw no reason why this concept 
could not apply to internal conflicts as well.254 In addition, the Chamber referred to some 
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other international instruments as evidencing general acceptance of States that the principle 
of command responsibility applies to internal conflicts under customary international law.255 
In Furundžija, when the Trial Chamber contemplated whether a forced oral penetration 
constitutes an international crime of rape, it referred to international instruments, 
international criminal and international human rights jurisprudence, the general principles of 
ICL and international law, and general principles of law recognized in national legislations. 
Interestingly, since the Chamber found no definition of rape under customary international 
law it searched to ascertain the elements of the crime first through the general principles of 
ICL, and failing that, through the general principles of international law, and finally through 
general principles of criminal law “common to the major legal systems of the world”. But due 
to a major discrepancy of national legislations, no common definition of rape that would 
include forced oral penetration was found. Even this did not stop the judges from seeking 
such a rule. Resorting to “general principle of respect for human dignity” that was found 
eventually from humanitarian and human rights law, the definition of rape was finally 
broadened.256 
The ICTY’s evaluation on customary rules in Furundžija was quite purposeful since the 
given rule was established beforehand and the interpretations on customary law followed 
subsequently. According to van den Herik, this demonstrates how customary law has been 
utilized by the ICTY to validate a given interpretation.257 In general, the practice of the ICTY 
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seems to follow largely the modernized version of custom formation, but in some cases it 
goes even further than this. Instead of basing their findings on inductive or deductive 
reasoning, judges of the Tribunal sometimes establish a given rule first and explain the value 
of State practice subsequently in its light.258 Hence, in the ICTY’s jurisprudence, opinio juris 
has prevailed largely over State practice.259 Interestingly, in his dissenting opinion in Stakić 
Judge Shahabuddeen introduced an approach that disregarded State practice entirely:  
In appreciating the "essence" of a clarification, the question to be attended to is not 
whether a particular set of circumstances was ever concretely recognized by the existing 
law, but whether those circumstances reasonably fall within the scope of the existing law. 
[…] In other words, the question is not whether the law, as it stands, was ever applied 
concretely to a particular set of circumstances, but whether the law, as it stands, was 
reasonably capable of applying to those circumstances.260 
 
Needless to say, this opinion has aroused some criticism.261 
As noted above, the Tribunals have often used judicial decisions, particularly those of the ICJ 
and some domestic courts, to support newly discovered rules of customary law. It is often 
unclear whether such judgments are used as reflections of State practice or opinio juris, or 
both. As noted, national and international judgments can both evidence the crystallization of 
a new rule of customary international law, but by themselves they should not be able to form 
one. Unfortunately, it seems that in Tadic, judges of the ICTY focused on the ICJ’s ruling in 
Nicaragua (and later in the jurisprudence of the Iran-USA Claims Tribunal) as a primary and 
only source of law in order to internationalize the armed conflict, even though this was never 
expressly pronounced in the judgment.262 
As mentioned, the SCSL follows the jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals to some extent. 
To make an example, in Fofana the customary status of article 3 of the Geneva Conventions 
and its applicability to both internal and international armed conflicts was proved by referring 
to the decisions of the ICJ and the ICTY.263 Besides this, the SCSL has resorted to all sorts of 
evidence in identifying customary law. In its famous Taylor case, the SCSL Appeals 
Chamber concluded that international law did not grant immunity from criminal prosecution 
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on a head of state. In this decision it relied on various sources, such as the statutes of the 
ICTY, ICTR, and ICC, GA resolutions, an ICJ’s decision (Democratic Republic of the Congo 
v. Belgium), scholarly views, and a British domestic court decision.264 Moreover in Norman, 
when the SCSL Appeals Chamber held that child recruitment into armed forces was 
criminalized under customary international law, it deemed that widespread ratification of 
several treaties was enough to fulfill the element of State practice.265 
To conclude, even though the jurisprudence of the UN Tribunals distantly resembles the 
modern approach to custom formation, it does not to wholly comply with neither of the 
theories addressed above. Hoffman argues that due to the aforementioned Secretary-
General’s statement on the subject-matter jurisdiction of the ICTY the Tribunal should be 
obliged to recourse to conservative and positivist methods of identifying customary law.266 
However, the approach taken by the ICTY has departed from the traditional view on several 
occasions. This is the case with the SCSL as well. The given overview of these tribunals’ 
case law reveals that they have not followed only one but several methods in identifying 
customary norms.267 Yet the tribunals themselves have not articulated their method(s), which 
has led to a severe criticism. Zahar, for instance, argues that the only identifiable method in 
the ICTY’s practice has been an aspiration to fill in gaps of law, i.e., “to legislate from the 
bench”.268  
Yet one must take into account that there existed only little State practice, domestic 
legislation, or judicial precedents that the ICTY could have relied on. Given this scarcity of 
applicable sources available, the more lenient approach taken by the ICTY may be justified. 
As Van den Herik argues, the amount of evidence needed to confirm the customary status of 
a given rule differs per situation. Even a small amount of consistent State practice may 
suffice to create a customary rule if no deviations can be detected.269 As to the question 
whether there has been a method of discovering customary law in the jurisprudence of the 
UN Tribunals, I cannot provide a straightforward answer of yes or no. Instead, it is safe to say 
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that there is no single, identifiable, method to confirm.270 It is important to keep this in mind 
in respect of the following discourse about the legislative interpretations of these courts. 
8. Progressive Development of Law through Judicial Activity 
 
Wir wollten Gerechtigkeit und bekamen den Rechtsstaat 
  -Bärbel Bohley 
 
8.1 The Principle of Legality 
As ICL constitutes out of two bodies, international law and criminal law, it must be appraised 
from both standpoints. Although the two bodies seem compatible, criminal law sets out 
certain fundamental requirements that are unfamiliar to some areas of international law. 
When international criminal courts apply ICL they draw from the sources of international law 
but comply with the fundamental principles of criminal law. Due to one distinctive feature of 
ICL, the fact that individuals can be held accountable, the rights of the accused must be 
protected. This is carried out by applying the principle of legality, nullum crimen sine lege.271 
This principle is deemed to have particular prominence in the international sphere due to the 
incoherent nature of international law. 272  All international organizations, including 
international criminal courts, are bound by the principle of legality. However, it is usually the 
customary international law version of this principle that they follow.273 Only the ICC has its 
own provisions concerning this principle. 
8.1.1 Rationale of the Principle of Legality 
The principle of legality can be seen as a part of the more general ideal of the rule of law.274 
Usually, it is addressed in the context of criminal law.275 Its primary objective is to protect 
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individuals against arbitrary and discriminatory use of power by the government. 276  In 
judicial practice, however, “foreseeability and accessibility are the central notions of the 
principle of legality”.277 Four aspects within the principle of legality can be distinguished: 
punishment according to law (nullum crimen sine lege), ban of retroactivity (lex praevia), ban 
of analogy (lex stricta), and requirement of specificity (lex certa).278 All these aspects come 
into play when criminal courts submit to judicial creativity. 279  Hence the particular 
importance of the principle of legality in criminal proceedings. 
Before proceeding to the features of the principle of legality in international law, it must be 
noted that an absolute notion of strict legality, and thus non-retroactivity, is impossibility.280 
This is mainly caused by the indeterminacy of language (be it either statutory or case law). 
Even in civil law systems the application of criminal provisions requires interpretation. 
Hardly ever a statutory provision matches completely with real life incidents, so a given 
provision must be applied to new circumstances. Therefore, all judicial praxis is retrospective 
in some respect, and since “the ideal of lex certa can never be absolute” the question is 
whether the law is certain enough.281 
8.1.2 The Principle of Legality in International Law 
In international law, the principle of legality is deemed to be sui generis in nature as it differs 
from its national counterparts. Since international law contains many unwritten rules, some 
scholars have suggested that the maxim nullum crimen sine iure would meet the requirements 
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of legality more precisely. 282 The phrase also characterizes the limited role that the principle 
of legality has played in international law. Indeed, some have argued that this principle, 
particularly in respect of humanitarian law practice, has derived a new meaning in 
international law that no longer respects its original background.283 The major challenge for 
the principle of legality derives from the vagueness of ICL.284  This branch of law still 
contains a number of poorly defined concepts. Given this indeterminacy, the contribution of 
courts, both national and international, is essential in modifying and clarifying these concepts. 
On the other hand, this is bound to increase the fragmentation of ICL since so many courts 
within their own legal systems participate in developing ICL.285  
The principle of legality can be found from several international conventions, such as the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) and the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR).286 In all of these conventions the punishment of individuals 
directly under international law is accepted. However, none of these conventions (nor the 
principle of legality in general) requires that the prohibition of criminal conduct should be 
based on some particular source of international law. To mention, all prohibitions under 
international law do not entail criminal responsibility. After it has been established that a 
certain prohibition exists under international law, it must also be established that the 
prohibition applies to individuals, is sufficiently foreseeable and accessible, and entails 
criminal responsibility.287 
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8.2 Judicial Law-Making in Theory 
No doubt international criminal tribunals have been highly influential in developing ICL 
throughout its history. In particular, the contribution of the ICTY has been huge. Not to 
mention its impact on procedural rules considering international criminal proceedings, the 
ICTY’s case law has clarified several elements of substantive law: definitions of crimes, 
features of armed conflict, the applicability of the law of war crimes to internal armed 
conflicts, etc. What comes to the so-called general part of ICL, the ICTY has elaborated on 
the principle of legality, modes of criminal liability, and the application of the stare decisis 
doctrine to mention but a few.288 Focusing mainly on the definitions of the core crimes, in 
this section I address the question whether the principle of legality prohibits an international 
criminal court from regarding an act as a crime when the definition of the crime has 
subsequently been specified by the court during the process. 289  The respected views of 
various scholars usually differ on how flexible the definitions of crimes are and how to deal 
with possible exceptions of the main rule of legality. 
The ECHR as well as the ICCPR include a rather liberal notion on the principle of legality. 
These conventions allow punishment according to “act or omission which, at the time when it 
was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law recognized by 
civilized nations” (ECHR) or “by the community of nations” (ICCPR). 290  According to 
Shahabuddeen, these provisions mean that the demands of specificity are met if the conduct 
is regarded as “fundamentally criminal” (by the community or by civilized nations), 
regardless of whether the correspondence between the definition of the crime and the act is 
perfect or not.291 This point of view can be criticized. 
What is at stake here is the foreseeability and accessibility of criminal law. Every individual 
person should know whether certain conduct constitutes a crime under international law. The 
issue is twofold. It is not enough that the conduct is “fundamentally criminal”, but it has to be 
criminal under international law. The difference comes important when the core crimes are 
differentiated from the “original” ones. At first, one has to be able to predict whether his or 
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her act constitutes a crime under international law or national law. Indeed, it is a question of 
jurisdiction to prescribe.292 A person should be able to tell which laws will be applied to him 
or her. In this respect, the principle serves as a limitation of both jurisdiction to prescribe and 
jurisdiction to adjudicate.293 Secondly, it is a question of punishment according to law, not 
moral. It is not enough that an act is fundamentally wrong or even illegal under international 
law; it has to be criminal (under international law) in order to provide for individual criminal 
responsibility. If the definition of a crime is altered during the court proceeding, the new 
definition may either exceed the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court or be treated as 
retroactive creation of substantive law. 
The case concerning Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE) doctrine illustrates well how the issue of 
legality can be manifested both as jurisdictional and substantive law matter.294 In this case the 
Appeals Chamber considered whether the new definition of crime fell within the scope of the 
subject-matter jurisdiction of the Court, but also, whether the new form of liability (the JCE 
doctrine) in fact existed under international humanitarian law.295 
However, the issue is merely theoretical at its best. It is not a prerequisite that the person 
involved need actually have foreseen the applicability of the law to his or her actions, not to 
mention (whether the act falls within) the exact definition of a crime. If even judges at 
international tribunals are in pains to establish the foreseeability and accessibility of a crime, 
one cannot surely expect that every individual is capable of doing this. It is rather a question 
of public awareness: could the act in question have been reasonably understood as criminal 
under existing law?296 This begs the question whether foreseeability of the law is de facto 
determined according to moral imperatives instead of actual existing legal provisions. 
In the Nuremberg trials, for example, perceptions of moral justice prevailed over strict 
legality.297  As Gallant phrase it: “[t]he point of horror at which this [the acceptance of 
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retroactive crime creation] occurs is the point at which anyone who is a positivist decides that 
there is a natural law of humanity prohibiting these acts.”298 Indeed, even Kelsen wrote in 
1947: 
Justice required the punishment of these men, in spite of the fact that under positive law 
they were not punishable at the time they performed the acts made punishable with 
retroactive force. In case two postulates of justice are in conflict with each other, the 
higher one prevails; and to punish those who were morally responsible for the 
international crime of the Second World War may certainly be considered as more 
important than to comply with the rather relative rule against ex post facto laws, open to 
so many exceptions.299 
 
It is important to notice that the principle of legality entered on the international stage only 
after the WWII. This can be seen somewhat as a reaction to the flexible approach taken in the 
Nuremberg trials. Quite recently, the ECtHR has stated that the purpose of the article 7(2) 
“was to specify that Article 7 did not affect laws which, in the wholly exceptional 
circumstances at the end of the Second World War, were passed in order to punish, inter alia, 
war crimes so that Article 7 does not in any way aim to pass legal or moral judgment on those 
laws”.300 According to Schabas, both the ECHR and the ICCPR endorse the approach of the 
Nuremberg IMT, “while implicitly acknowledging that it did not, strictly speaking, faithfully 
respect the nullum crimen principle.”301 
Thus, the approach of the Nuremberg Tribunal has been accepted expressly because of the 
prevailing circumstances.302 Although the retroactive crime creation at Nuremberg may have 
been acceptable, it is no longer so. As Gallant argues, the moral force that was used as a 
justification for this cannot displace legality in international law anymore since the principle 
of legality has obtained the status of customary international law.303 
The issue is not, however, that simple. The ban of retroactivity is a “rather relative rule” as 
Kelsen noted, at least in respect to international law. Authors such as Meron consider legality 
as more of an ideal, a principle whose application always involves an element of legal fiction; 
it would be naive to expect that all citizens have read and understood all criminal law 
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regulations. In respect of war crimes, for example, customary international law prohibits acts 
“that everyone would assume to be criminal anyway”. 304  Surely this should satisfy the 
populace’s sense of justice. As Foucault has noted, the distinction between forbidden and 
permitted has stayed quite the same from one century to another. What has changed is how 
we relate with the crime itself, “the object with which penal practice is concerned, has 
profoundly altered: the quality, the nature, in a sense the substance of which the punishable 
element is made, rather than its formal definition. Undercover of the relative stability of the 
law, a mass of subtle and rapid changes has occurred.”305 
Interestingly, the demands of justice and natural law have maintained a strong position in 
German legal history after the Nuremberg trials. Perhaps as a response to the Nazi regime’s 
abuse of the legislation process justice-promoting theories, such as the “Radbruch formula”, 
have gained support in German judicature. According to the formula, even unjust and 
irrational positive law prevails over substantive notions of justice unless the contradiction 
becomes intolerable. The limit of intolerableness is reached when positive law neglects the 
aims of justice and equality explicitly and systematically. 306  Prominent is that even the 
ECtHR has approved the usage of this theory.307 The basic idea behind the Radbruch formula 
is significant and embodies the values and goals of criminal law; politically used criminal law 
that neglects the goals of justice should be considered null and void. The philosophy is not 
unfamiliar to other legal traditions either: the equity system of English common law history, 
for instance, shares some similarities with the formula. 308  What comes to international 
criminal proceedings, the so called “Martens clause”, used by the Trial Chamber of the ICTY 
in Kupreškić, seems to follow this idea as well.309 
8.3 Judicial Law-Making in Practice 
International criminal courts are thus obligated to apply substantive criminal rules that existed 
at the time of the defendant’s act. However, they are allowed to elaborate on existing rules, as 
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the ICTY Appeals Chamber set out in Aleksovski.310 The way in which the ICTY has used 
customary law to recast the definitions of some of the core crimes is in the gray area of 
legality. In the following chapters, I provide a framework for a universal stance on the limits 
of progressive development of law in international criminal proceedings. In order to do this, I 
must draw from various sources. For instance, there is no external human rights court 
supervising the practice of international criminal courts. Thus, there are no precedents 
evaluating whether the praxis of these courts is in line with the principle of legality.311 
However, the case law of the ECtHR has great importance in respect of the principle of 
legality in ICL. Although international courts are not bound by rulings of the ECtHR, its 
rulings are authoritative to the member States of the ECHR.312 Since ICL is not limited to 
international criminal courts’ practice, the influence of the ECtHR can emerge through 
domestic case law as well. Indeed, some important rulings have proven to be highly relevant 
in recent legal discourse on the matter.313 
The jurisprudence of the ECtHR has had great importance to international criminal courts’ 
work and vice versa. Contrary to some predictions, the number of direct references from 
international criminal courts to ECtHR’s case law appears to have increased in recent years 
and seems to increase also in the future.314 The recent symposium on the influence of the 
ECtHR’s case law on ICL proposes that the Court holds a significant position in the dialogue 
between judges of international criminal tribunals. 315  Due to the great number of courts 
participating in this dialogue, many fear incoherence and fragmentation of ICL but as 
Schabas suggests the interaction between ECtHR and ICL can also be described as 
synergistic. 316  Although the Court operates physically in Strasbourg, it is not made to 
promote European human rights but universal values.317 
The importance of the ECtHR’s case law in international criminal proceedings has increased 
in recent years since it has expanded to areas of ICL, and particularly to issues concerning 
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substantive law. Quite recently, the Court has explored the application of the principle of 
legality in respect of war crimes,318 crimes against humanity,319 and genocide.320 However, 
the interaction between the ECtHR and international criminal courts is a complex issue. 
There is a certain tension between human rights and criminal law, and one can certainly 
question whether international criminal courts are the place to promote human rights 
obligations. The ECtHR is unlikely to serve as an “appeals” court on human rights issues in 
the future, but its participation in the dialogue between courts is crucial.321 
8.3.1 The European Court of Human Rights 
The ECtHR held in C.R. v. United Kingdom that the rules of criminal liability can be clarified 
through judicial interpretation insofar as “the resulting development is consistent with the 
essence of the offence and could reasonably be foreseen”. 322  The case concerned the 
development of law in English common law tradition. It was remarkable because the 
husband’s legal immunity concerning marital rape was removed in the British court 
proceedings. Since marital rape was not prohibited in the UK at the time of commission, the 
question was whether the British courts had breached article 7(1) of the ECHR by extending 
the definition of rape. The European Court held that the British court ruling was in line with 
the article 7(1) of the ECHR. The decision of the ECtHR has gained significant attention. 
Even though it concerned national legislation based on English common law tradition, the 
ruling was embraced later by the ICTY in Ojdanić.323 This may not come of a total surprise 
since international law is deemed to be akin more to English law tradition than to others.324 
A few years later the Court contemplated the Berlin Wall shootings and killings committed 
by the border guards of the former GDR. Because of the policy of the GDR’s National 
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Defence Council to protect the border at all costs, several people were killed trying to cross 
over to the FRG. After the unification of Germany several former East German soldiers were 
convicted of these killings even though they were under orders –and the former socialist law, 
applicable at the time, entitled them– to annihilate all border violators. In addition, three 
senior officials of the GDR, Streletz, Kessler, and Krenz, were convicted of the border 
killings by the courts of the FRG.325 All three appealed arguing that they acted according to 
general State policy and laws applicable at the time. The convictions were upheld by the 
Federal Court of Justice, and the Federal Constitutional Court declared that the convictions 
were compatible with the constitutional law referring to the Radbruch formula.326  
The case was finally brought to ECtHR together with one application from a low-ranking 
border guard, K-H.W, who was convicted of shooting of one border violator.327 In both cases 
the ECtHR held that the GDR's border-policing policy, i.e., State practice, could not be 
considered as "law" within the meaning of article 7 of the ECHR and thus was not covered by 
the protection of article 7(1) of the Convention. The Court concluded that the applicants’ acts 
constituted offences defined with sufficient accessibility and foreseeability at the time of 
commission both in GDR law and international law, when read together.328 The border guard 
cases imply that the punishment of cruel atrocities does not violate the ban of retroactivity 
since such acts must be punished at all costs. However, one must consider these rulings in 
light of the circumstances of the time, the history of confrontation in Germany during the 
cold war and the fresh memory of the cruelties committed by the Nazi regime in WWII. As 
important as they are, these cases can be used only limitedly to determinate the limits of 
legality within ICL. However, the Court has quite recently evaluated national understandings 
of international crimes in three important cases. 
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In Korbely, Hungarian courts applied ICL directly and deemed that a violation of article 3 of 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions was criminalized as a crime against humanity under 
international law. Since the Hungarian understanding about the crimes against humanity 
differed from its international definition (the Hungarian view did not entail the requirement 
that the act would have to be a part of widespread and systematic attack against civilian 
population), the ECtHR had to evaluate whether the act was defined with sufficient 
accessibility and foreseeability as an offence under international law at the time of 
commission. The Court held that it was not foreseeable that the applicant’s acts constituted a 
crime against humanity under international law. Therefore, the Hungarian courts had violated 
article 7(1) of the ECHR. 329  Similarly in Jorgić, the ECtHR evaluated the German 
understanding about the international crime of genocide. The Court stated that national 
interpretations of international crimes must not be entirely identical with their international 
counterparts. What matters is that the essence of the offence remains and that the national 
interpretation of the international crime is reasonably foreseen.330 
Quite recently, the Court has explored also a Latvian interpretation of an international crime. 
In Kononov, the applicant was prosecuted for war crimes committed in 1944, and he 
complained that his acts (killing of collaborators during the war) could not be considered as a 
war crime at the time. The main issue was whether the law used in the Nuremberg IMT 
should be applied in today’s case dealing with events that occurred during the WWII. 
Kononov, a Soviet partisan during WWII, was convicted of war crimes committed in Latvia, 
Mazie Bati, in 1944. In the Mazie Bati killings, Kononov led a unit into a Latvian village 
where, posing as German Wehrmacht offices, they killed 9 people, including three women, 
one of which was in the latest stages of pregnancy. In its final ruling, the ECtHR stated that 
the execution of villagers violated international law at the time, particularly since Kononov's 
unit was wearing German disguises. According to the Court, Kononov was entitled only to 
arrest the villagers, not to kill them. 
At first, the Court held that the applicant could not reasonably have foreseen that his acts 
amounted to a war crime under the jus in bello applicable at the time. However, the ruling 
was reversed by the Grand Chamber stating that “there was a sufficiently clear legal basis, 
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having regard to the state of international law in 1944, for the applicant’s conviction and 
punishment for war crimes.” The Court concluded that “at the time when they were 
committed, the applicant's acts constituted offences defined with sufficient accessibility and 
foreseeability by the laws and customs of war.”331 Interestingly, the Grand Chamber referred 
to the Nuremberg Principles in declaring norms of customary international law.332 
The ECtHR’s praxis demonstrates that the principle of legality does not have a strict 
positivistic character in human rights law. The ECtHR’s ruling on C.R v. United Kingdom  
favors an approach that forces the populace to behave on moral values, i.e., to avoid morally 
dubious practices and to predict what kind of behavior will be considered illegal in near 
future.333 To criticize, such customary law that changes along with changing attitudes of 
society is not predictable since we cannot know what these attitudes are beforehand but only 
post facto. In addition, on the international stage this would lead to a complete apologism.334 
However, the case was not about creating new crimes or expanding the definition of a crime 
but about removing immunity.335  Indeed, there is a long way from removing a personal 
immunity for a criminal act to applying ex post facto laws and thus criminalizing acts that 
were not crimes at the time of their commission, as Meron has pointed out.336  Even in 
common law tradition, the era of judge-made crime creation seems to be over.337 What comes 
to the border guard cases, the ECtHR favored an approach of doing justice in times of 
injustice regardless of what positive law says if the law is wicked in itself. But as noted above, 
these cases along with C.R v. United Kingdom represent ECtHR’s solutions on national 
legislation within national justice systems (although the border guard cases had some 
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connection with international law) and they cannot be used as such directly to determine the 
limits of progressive development of ICL.  
But the latter cases do not provide a straightforward solution to the problem either. For 
instance, Kononov's conviction was overturned once in domestic appellate courts but he was 
subsequently charged again by the prosecutor following a new investigation and convicted. 
Afterwards, the ECtHR overturned his case twice. What does this tell us about the 
foreseeability of law? It would be unrealistic to expect Kononov to have foreseen the 
content of positive law at the time and under the war-time circumstances if even judges 
have disagreed over it subsequently in such a manifest manner. Perhaps it is for this 
very reason that judges often emphasize the moral wrongfulness of the act instead of the 
definition of the crime set out in law. Although judges are bound to apply positive law, 
individuals often evaluate their acts on the basis of moral perceptions. 
To conclude, there are no clear limits that the principle of legality would provide.  
Expressions such as “the essence of the offence must remain” or that “the definition of the 
crime must be reasonably foreseen” give only little guidance if evaluated outside the context 
of the cases in which they were declared. Thus, the evaluation concerning the application of 
the principle of legality should be made on a case-by-case basis. At least above cases 
demonstrate that this does not always come without controversies. 
8.3.2 UN Tribunals 
The ad hoc Tribunals have struggled with the application of the principle of legality 
throughout their lengthy legal praxis. The judges contemplated the legal limits of progressive 
interpretation of law in so many cases that it is impossible to deal with all of them here. 
Instead, I will provide a brief overview of the approach that the Tribunals, particularly the 
ICTY, have taken towards judicial law-making. The case law of the SCSL is also briefly 
addressed here. 
8.3.2.1 Writing Moral as Law 
In Hadžihasanović, it was held that as to foreseeability, it is sufficient that the accused 
understands that the conduct in question is “criminal in the sense generally understood, 
without reference to any specific provision.” What comes to accessibility, the court held that 
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it does not exclude reliance on customary law.338 This was subsequently followed by the 
SCSL in Norman.339 
The ICTY Appeals Chamber held in Ojdanić that the principle of legality “does not prevent a 
court from interpreting and clarifying the elements of a particular crime.”340  The Court 
continued: 
Nor does it preclude the progressive development of the law by the court. But it does 
prevent a court from creating new law or from interpreting existing law beyond the 
reasonable limits of acceptable clarification. This Tribunal must therefore be satisfied 
that the crime or the form of liability with which an accused is charged was sufficiently 
foreseeable and that the law providing for such liability must be sufficiently accessible at 
the relevant time, taking into account the specificity of international law when making 
that assessment.341 
By “progressive development of the law” the Appeals Chamber referred to several rulings of 
the ECtHR and cited the C.R. v. United Kingdom judgment.342 By this the Appeals Chamber 
seemed to approve the ECtHR’s approach in the C.R. v. United Kingdom and affirm that 
progressive development of criminal law through judicial law-making is part of ICL as well, 
not just a distinctive feature of the common law tradition.  
It is difficult to determine when international law is sufficiently foreseeable and accessible 
for an individual. Usually individuals act within the knowledge of national laws.  These laws 
may provide some notice that a given act is criminal also under international law. However, 
international law does not completely correspond with any national legal system. Hence, the 
character of customary international law must be taken into account.343 Since international 
customary law includes several unwritten norms, its accessibility is not as straightforward as 
with written criminal codes. “But rules of customary law may provide sufficient guidance as 
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to the standard the violation of which could entail criminal liability.”344 All this implies that 
at the time of commission the perpetrator does not have to be fully aware which crime he or 
she is about to commit, not to mention the exact definition of that crime. It is enough that the 
perpetrator must know that he is committing a crime. This can be explained by the lack of 
specificity that customary law always contains.  
According to the Appeals Chamber, the atrocious and criminal nature of an act (together with 
domestic laws) can also be used to assist the evaluation of the foreseeability of a crime based 
on customary international law.  Domestic laws usually provide some notice that certain acts 
are regarded as criminal under international law and this may be used to establish that the 
accused could reasonably have known that his act was “prohibited and punishable”.345 Thus, 
the immorality of an act may be an important factor in determining whether the perpetrator 
has committed a crime under customary international law even though it is not sufficient to 
create criminal liability on its own.346 Although the Ojdanić motion concerned a form of 
criminal liability (JCE doctrine) the case illustrates well how the ICTY deemed that 
foreseeability and accessibility of customary international law are to be established. In my 
opinion, this case tends to over-emphasize the immorality and wrongfulness of a particular 
act in order to demonstrate its criminality. 
One interesting case concerning the importance of morality in ICTY’s case law is the 
Judgment in Kupreškić, which has subsequently been criticized for its moral nuance. 347 In 
this case the Trial Chamber, presided by Professor Cassese, considered whether military 
reprisals against civilians are prohibited under customary international law. Apparently, the 
Chamber ignored almost completely contrary State practice and relied on the Martens clause 
in order to identify the customary rule in question.348 The Chamber held that a widespread 
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opinio necessitatis prohibiting reprisals against civilians can be detected, and this was enough 
to confirm the customary status of the rule.349 
According to Meron, the principle of legality is designed to protect persons only from being 
punished for an act that he or she believed to be lawful when committed. Hence, the principle 
of legality would not require that the customary status of every crime in question should be 
established by the court as long as the unlawfulness of the act is clear.350 The ICTY followed 
this view in Ojdanić.351 In addition, in Čelebiči the Appeals Chamber held that as long as the 
perpetrators knew that they were committing an act that is criminal in nature “[t]he fact that 
they could not foresee the creation of an International Tribunal which would be the forum for 
prosecution is of no consequence.”352 Given this, the ICTY’s approach as well as Meron’s 
arguments seem to disregard that some prosecutions may be subject of international, rather 
than national, jurisdiction. This certainly raises the question of foreseeability and accessibility 
since the gravity of the crime may be something else when it amounts to international level. 
Nonetheless, Meron’s point of view is in line with the practice of the ECtHR. The criminal 
nature of certain acts, such as murder or torture, is always clear, as noted by the ECtHR in 
Kononov.353 However, it is usually not that clear whether these acts amount to war crimes. 
For instance, some acts may not be so clearly prohibited when carried out in extraordinary 
circumstances (where one could plead on military necessity for example) than if they were 
carried out in ordinary circumstances.354 What follows is that a defendant who commits an 
act of murder or torture knowing that he or she can be convicted under domestic law may not 
realize that he or she could also be convicted under international law of the war crime of 
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murder or torture in non-international armed conflict.355 The ECtHR’s ruling in Kononov 
gave only little weight to this question.  
8.3.2.2 Creating New Crimes: The Definition of the International Crime of Rape 
The creation of the definition of rape in international law by the ad hoc Tribunals offers a 
good example of something that could be called judicial creativity. The Akayesu case was the 
very first conviction in the ICTR and also the first conviction of rape as a crime against 
humanity. More importantly, it was recognized for the first time that rape can also constitute 
an act of genocide. Before Akayesu there was no commonly accepted definition of rape in 
international law, as the Trial Chamber noted,356 and the judgment fulfilled this lacuna in the 
law.357 The Akayesu judgment has been both praised and criticized for its creativity and 
progressiveness. The need for a definition of rape in international law was vital at the time 
and the significance of this legal creation cannot be overstated. However, the definition has 
been criticized over its vagueness and legal basis. Not only failing to comply with the proper 
sources of international law, the Chamber disregarded the application of the principle of 
legality. The Chamber did not refer to any legal instruments or previous case law that would 
have supported the new definition. Moreover, the whole judgment omitted to take a stance on 
whether the crime existed in any form in customary international law at the time of 
commission.358 
The creativity concerning the definition of rape did not end to this at the ad hoc Tribunals.359 
In Furundžija, the ICTY Trial Chamber considered whether forced oral sex fell within the 
concept of rape in ICL. There was no case or a treaty in international law, nor consistent 
national practice, that would have affirmed this even though forced oral sex was regarded 
generally as criminal in national laws. Even national legislations did not identify any 
common definition that would have solved the problem, so the Chamber went on to apply the 
“general principle of respect for human dignity”, which it referred to be a basic underpinning 
of international humanitarian law and human rights law and which permeated the whole body 
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of international law. Moreover, it was a principle that, according the judges, favored 
broadening the definition of rape.360 It is remarkable how the judges invoked the objectives of 
law as an interpretational element in determining the content of customary law.  
The approach taken by the Trial Chamber can certainly be characterized as a progressive 
interpretation of law. However, unlike in Akayesu, the Chamber applied the principle of 
legality and made a special reference to the requirement of specificity.361 About the principle 
of legality the Chamber noted the following: 
Moreover, the Trial Chamber is of the opinion that it is not contrary to the general 
principle of nullum crimen sine lege to charge an accused with forcible oral sex as rape 
when in some national jurisdictions, including his own, he could only be charged with 
sexual assault in respect of the same acts. It is not a question of criminalising acts which 
were not criminal when they were committed by the accused, since forcible oral sex is in 
any event a crime, and indeed an extremely serious crime.362 
 
The judges of the ad hoc Tribunals have had an important impact on the evolution of rape as 
an international crime. Without their contribution such a reasonable and functional definition 
could not have been created within such a short time frame. The judges have not escaped 
criticism and allegations of impartiality, in particular, since female judges played a major role 
in these creative and progressive rulings. 363  Importantly, the ECtHR declared in MC v. 
Bulgaria that the ICTY’s jurisprudence on the definition of rape “reflects a universal 
trend”.364 The result in Furundžija has also been codified in the ICC’s Elements of Crimes.365  
Although the ruling in Furundžija seems exceptional, judicial interpretations based on 
internationally recognized values are not unfamiliar to domestic courts either. Fundamental 
principles of international law, such as respect for human dignity, are used to create 
innovative solutions that answer to the changing needs of society as well as the whole 
international community. As Iovane points out, the vague nature of these principles makes 
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evolutive interpretations possible as they represent the moral views of the community as 
whole.366 
To conclude, the ICTY –or international criminal courts in general– has not applied the 
strictest definition of the principle of legality (nullum crimen sine praevia lege scripta), as 
Gallant notes.367 First of all, the requirement of written law (lex scripta) is rejected. More 
importantly, is seems to be enough that a given act is “criminal in the sense generally 
understood” (as formulated in Hadžihasanović) to provide for criminal responsibility under 
international law. This phrase seems somewhat problematic in its whole obscureness. As 
noted by Gallant, it might allow courts to “re-characterize” national crimes into international 
crimes retroactively,368 an act which is regarded as forbidden analogy by some.369 Thus, what 
contemporary ICL requires is that the defendant should have reasonably foreseen that his/her 
act was to be held criminal under some existing law applicable at the time of commission. It 
is of no matter if the person cannot actually identify the crime or its elements he/she is 
convicted of. If the prohibition is found only from national law, it could possibly be still 
transferred to international law since the national criminalization indicates that it is regarded 
generally criminal. 
8.4 Two Competing Arguments: Substantive Justice and Strict Legality 
The presented case law reveals that the application of the principle of legality is very much 
alive in international criminal proceedings. Indeed, judges at the Tribunals have taken pains 
to articulate their innovative solutions in terms of legality.  What is remarkable about their 
arguments is that they constantly seem to struggle between two competing doctrines. On the 
one hand, they attempt to ensure the rights of the accused by resorting to the principle of 
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legality. On the other, they attempt to pursue the aims of justice, accountability, and world 
order by providing humane interpretations of law. 370 
However, since some of the elements of the core crimes and liability forms under the ICTY’s 
jurisdiction were only evolving at the time most of the crimes were committed, the Court 
faced serious difficulties in providing fair and just trials. No doubt the substance of the core 
crimes has always been morally condemned but this is not enough for criminal conviction; 
the conduct has to be prohibited in law and provide for individual criminal liability. This is 
the primary fault of custom-based criminalization. In the absence of textual authority, it is 
difficult to say exactly when moral condemnation evolved into law that proscribed criminal 
liability. In response, judges of the ICTY had to reconcile substantive justice and strict 
legality. In considering how to prioritize these notions, they have resorted to the objectives of 
ICL, considered whether a breach of international law exists, and evaluated the wrongfulness 
of the act in question.371 
8.4.1 The Complex Interplay of Immorality, Illegality, and Criminality 
In the identification of relevant State practice, there is a trend in which judges have resorted 
to behavior that corresponds with the general idea of justice. The criticism directed towards 
the selectivity of the ICTY in this respect is appropriate, but the same kind of selectivity 
exists in the case law of the ICJ, particularly in the Nicaragua Case. It seems that the amount 
of support from State practice and opinio juris required to form new customary norms 
depends on the value and importance of those norms. In ICL, factors such as changing social 
needs and moral wrongfulness of the act have guided the formation law, as evidenced by the 
C.R. v. United Kingdom and Furundžija cases.372  
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As Van Schaack writes, the core judicial arguments concerning the application of the 
principle of legality in international criminal proceedings circle around immorality, illegality 
and criminality.373 In this respect it is important to note that Sir Hartley Shawcross, the 
British prosecutor at the Nuremberg trial, argued on closing that there is “no difference 
between illegality and criminality”.374 This is certainly not an up to date state of affairs since 
it is now widely acknowledged that not every violation of international law, i.e., illegal act, 
creates criminal liability. The equation of illegality with criminality is a result of the fact that 
most modern treaties that compose the foundations of ICL were originally made to regulate 
State conduct, not to be used as penal statutes for convicting individuals. Only through the 
jurisprudence of international criminal tribunals have the direct addressees of these 
regulations transformed from States to individuals.  
Thus, the judges have had to identify what constitutes criminality in each case. In identifying 
this they have often resorted to the moral wrongfulness of the act and to the objective and 
purpose of ICL; whether it would be against the interest of justice to let the actors escape 
accountability.375 In the end, the used arguments fall into the two aforementioned categories 
of justice and legality. Judges often find themselves struggling between these two competing 
notions as they consider how far the principle of legality can be stretched in the name of 
justice to convict perpetrators of serious atrocities even if the conduct in question was not 
clearly prohibited in ICL at the time of commission. 
8.4.2 Recourse to Human Rights Argument 
The three aforementioned arguments used in judicial reasoning (illegality, morality, and the 
objectives of ICL) resemble arguments often used by human rights lawyer, and many of the 
developments in ICL derive from human rights ideology. Indeed, one peculiar phenomenon 
of the late 20th century was the human rights movement’s invasion into international law, and 
particularly into ICL. This has had its impact on the formation of customary international law. 
Human rights and humanitarian law obligations have obfuscated the process by assuming that 
international law builds upon some core values of the international community. 
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While there may be some truth in this, there is a certain tension between human rights and 
ICL. Although their main objectives share some similarities, they also have important 
differences. Human rights are a poor justification for a criminal conviction. Resorting to them 
may release the judge from the burden of subjective perception but does not manage to 
legitimate his or her decisions. In the end, human rights represent the core values of the 
Western societies, and more importantly, they can be (and increasingly are!) used as leverage 
for pursuing political agendas since there is no consensus over who has the authority to 
declare the fundamental and obligatory human rights.  
The assumption of the apolitical nature of human rights can easily be questioned. Biletzki, for 
instance, argues that the politicization of human rights is very real both in theory and 
praxis.376 As she notes, pragmatic human rights lawyers often use the universal status of 
human rights to argue the separation of human rights and politics. In contrast, strict positivists 
defend human rights against the accusation of their political nature by grounding them on 
law- “for the law is conventionally thought to be beyond and above politics.”377 This clear 
contradiction reveals the obscurity surrounding human rights, specifically, the sources they 
derive from. Defending human rights through the concept of “universalism” assumes that we 
have common universal values to protect. 378  Unfortunately, in our world of moral 
disagreement such values hardly exist. Grounding judicial reasoning on such values simply 
rejects the idea of legality and exposes law to political abuse and subjective interpretations. 
As noted by de Frouville, human rights are “more a language than a substance”.379  
Yet, I cannot deny that human rights law, particularly the work of the ECtHR, has promoted 
the application of the principle of legality. But although this principle has been a major 
concern in legal discourse concerning international criminal proceedings, the discourse is not 
always driven by a sincere concern about the rights of the accused. As Schabas writes, during 
the drafting of the Rome Statute where legality was a major topic the participants seemed to 
be more concerned about the consequences that might occur for the States themselves, rather 
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than individuals, since the core crimes are usually connected with State activities.380 This 
demonstrates that authorities promoting human rights may often, in reality, be driven by 
political imperatives. 
In the end, human rights represent vital values of the international society that go beyond 
positive law -the moral standards- and guide the formation of the law. However, the principle 
of legality requires that the inclusion of “the moral consideration” should not occur in courts 
applying the law but in the legislative process because moral norms lack clear and 
unambiguous content and basis. While human rights play an important role in the judicial 
process, guaranteeing the fair trial requirements etc., it is not for the court to integrate the 
moral standards they represent into substantive legal rules.381  
International criminal courts should not be seen as platforms for promoting these norms. 
There are strong arguments not to let human rights law gain too much ground in the judicial 
arena. This may lead some people to question the basics of the Furundžija Trial Judgment 
where the customary law definition of the international crime of rape was broadened by 
resorting to “general principle of respect for human dignity”. It is difficult to argue where this 
principle originated if not from ideologies of humanitarian law and human rights law, since it 
certainly did not clarify through a consistent State practice or generally acknowledged opinio 
juris, the two necessary elements of customary law. 
But what should courts do when there is no law to apply? Many of the important decisions in 
the jurisprudence of the ICTY have been made in circumstances where there were no treaty 
provisions or clearly identified rules of customary law to apply. It seems that the ad hoc 
Tribunals have expanded the reach of ICL beyond positive law in these cases. It would be 
pointless to argue that the Court should have relied solely on existing rules of international 
law when a lacuna in positive law clearly existed. More importantly, would decisions 
convicting defendants of offenses, or under forms of liability, that were not part of positive 
law at the time have been foreseeable for the defendants? At least in the light of human rights 
law the jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals has largely been in line with the principle of 
legality, which requires, according to the ECtHR, that the essence of the offence must remain 
and that the defendant should have reasonably foreseen innovations under the circumstances.  
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8.4.3 Utilizing Custom to Make Law out of Morality 
Invoking the objectives of ICL, human rights law, or humanitarian law as a justification for 
rapid developments of law abandons the basic theories of custom formation. This opens the 
door for natural law arguments and subjective views of justice, both of which are against the 
basic idea of legality.382 Unfortunately, the most important norms (prohibition of genocide 
etc.) are those which cannot be argued for by reference to consent or past behavior, but only 
by “moral law”. This explains why the ad hoc Tribunals have not rigorously applied the 
traditional methods of custom formation when filling the gaps in positive law or “legalizing” 
these moral norms through the doctrine of customary law. Concepts like the objectives of law 
or immorality can easily be included in the opinio element of customary law. This causes 
opinio juris to constantly outweigh State practice in ICL, human rights law, and humanitarian 
law.383 
In Koskenniemi’s distinction between apology and utopia, Van Schaack notes that “utopians 
emerge dominant in international criminal law”. 384  This is a result of the retrospective 
application of ICL. Since most international criminal tribunals were established after 
atrocities occurred, their objectives have consisted of condemning these past horrors instead 
of applying prospective penal codes to future events. As a result, no international penal code 
has had an opportunity to develop and thus moral condemnation has overweighed the 
recourse to positive law.385 Fortunately, the ICC regime offers a welcome change to this state 
of affairs. 
8.4.4 The Unattainability of Substantive Justice and Strict Legality 
Thus judicial arguments struggle with balancing substantive justice and strict legality, but do 
not (or should not) solely resort to either of them since both these notions are unattainable. 
Rawls’ distinction between “partial compliance” and “ideal” theory elucidate the reasons for 
this unattainability. In the Theory of Justice Rawls separates these two concepts in order to 
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address the matter – the theory of justice – under utopian circumstances. In order to construct 
his ideal theory (known as “Justice as Fairness”) he had to set aside prevailing societal (real 
life) conditions. Thus, he created principles that were only applicable in ideal circumstances; 
the theory was never meant to be fully applicable in real life.386  
As Leslie P. and John G. Francis note, the typical circumstances under which international 
criminal tribunals have been invoked are those of partial compliance, “situations of 
unfavorable natural circumstances and situations of widespread human injustice”.387  The 
genocide in Rwanda, where countless individuals were forced to participate in the ongoing 
slaughter on pain of death, is a perfect example. In the judicial aftermath of such events it is 
hard to imagine that both requirements, substantive justice and strict legality, could be 
fulfilled. 
Thus, notions of substantive justice and strict legality are ideal principles, and not fully 
applicable in real life circumstances. Rather, they serve as the objectives of ICL, and they 
may even share the same goals, but they cannot be fulfilled simultaneously. Having a law that 
applies in all circumstances and produces fully just outcomes seems utopian. Therefore, we 
must accept that “the standards of justice must not simply be assumed to be those of ideal 
justice.”388  The same goes for legality. This is why the principle of legality sometimes 
hampers the aims of justice and vice versa.  
Now, it is left to the judges to determine at which point between justice and legality in dubio 
pro reo should apply. This evaluation has been made on a case-by-case basis leaving the 
point of beyond reasonable doubt somewhat indeterminate. No doubt, this indeterminacy has 
been utilized throughout the history of the ICL regime. The Nuremberg trial has already 
aroused a never ending debate between natural law and positive law approaches. Fuller and 
Hart had their famous debate in the 1950s about whether the Nuremberg precedent violated 
the principle of legality by reaching an outcome that seemed to be morally acceptable but 
legally questionable. Whereas Hart promoted strict legality and “fidelity to law”, Fuller 
argued that legality is rather a matter of the legislative process and that “the inner morality of 
law” should be appreciated in courts.389 
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To date, there has been no clear solution as to whether natural law or positive law should 
prevail in the judicial arena. In ideal circumstances, the both would lead to the same outcome. 
What is evident, though, is that occasionally natural law has the upper hand on positive law 
even though the general trend has moved towards the latter. There are good examples of this. 
For instance, concepts such as the Radbruch formula and Martens clause work as backups in 
the judicial process, a process that generally aims to operate on positive law. Bohlander 
argues that natural justice represents a kind of “safety-valve” in the German legal system, 
even though the system otherwise tends towards positivism.390 Quite similarly, in ICL there is 
an aspiration towards strict legality but also a desire to hold on to the magic wand of natural 
justice in order to remedy the unexpected emergence of gaps in the law. 
8.5 Conclusions 
Koskenniemi writes that in international law each discursive topic is “constituted by a 
conceptual opposition”; accordingly the discourse on progressive development of ICL is 
constituted by a juxtaposition between justice and legality, or naturalism and positivism, an 
endless struggle between two competing concepts attempting to be prioritized over one 
another. Furthermore, as Koskenniemi points out, these arguments, contradictory on first 
impression, in reality rely on each other since there cannot be law without justice or justice 
without law within ICL.391 
According to Cassese, international law has long operated on the basis of substantive justice 
and has only recently turned to the doctrine of strict legality.392 The retroactive application of 
international law in the WWII tribunals, and subsequently in the ad hoc tribunals, gave rise to 
the principle of legality on the international stage. One can certainly see the call for strict 
legality as a response to the overwhelming usage of moral argumentation as a justification for 
international convictions. However, it is unclear at exactly what point Cassese determined 
that strict legality overruled substantive justice. It seems that the application of substantive 
justice strongly prevailed even in relatively recent judicial praxis. 393  Nevertheless, the 
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aspiration towards strict legality is an ascending trend; this is manifested in court rulings and 
academic writings.  
The previous analysis of the ICTY’s case law reveals that in the end the goal determines the 
methods and arguments used in judicial decision-making. For instance, in Furundžija, the 
only acceptable and justifiable solution was to identify the atrocities committed as criminal 
under international law. The judges turned to new sources again and again until they were 
able to articulate a solution that could be held both just and (objectively) ascertainable. This 
reveals the pragmaticalness of international law and conforms to Koskenniemi’s observation 
that in international law (and particularly in respect of customary law) anything can be 
legalized.394 With formally valid and coherent arguments lawyers and judges can pursue any 
objectives they wish. 
The difficulty in applying the principle of legality in international proceedings is a collateral 
effect of international law’s original purpose of regulating state conduct. Because of this, the 
methods of criminalization are different in international and national criminal justice 
systems.395 Since the principle of legality is derived from national justice systems, it is no 
wonder international judges have difficulties applying it to the international environment. As 
long as customary law remains a primary source of ICL, strict positivism –and thus full 
implementation of the principle of legality in international criminal proceedings– is 
impossible. 
Acknowledging this, judges in international criminal courts and human rights courts have 
allowed this principle to obtain distinctive features in international law. It is not a strict rule 
that is fully applicable in all circumstances but a general principle of justice that appreciates 
the objectives of ICL.396 International criminal courts have convicted defendants of crimes 
and under forms of liabilities that were not part of positive law at the time of commission and 
thus have deviated from strict application of the principle of legality. However, the ECtHR 
has affirmed that the application of this principle does not demand strict legality; it requires 
that the essence of the offence remains and that the resulting development was foreseeable to 
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the defendant at the time of commission. The jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals has met 
these standards. 
 
 
PART III 
FUTURE PERSPECTIVES ON CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL         
CRIMINAL LAW 
 
 
9. Future Perspectives on Judicial Law-Making 
 
   In a world of saints, no law is needed. 
              -Martti Koskenniemi 
 
9.1 The ICC: Leading the Way towards Strict Legality 
By determining that the Elements of Crimes and the RPE would not be left for the judges to 
decide but were to be set out at the Assembly of States, drafters of the Rome Statute 
minimized the law-making capacity of the ICC in this respect. 397  Seemingly, the more 
cautious approach expresses the member States’ will to hold on to their sovereignty more 
closely. The elaborated and nearly exhaustive provisions of the Statute results in that the ICC 
does not have to resort to customary law provisions inasmuch as the UN Tribunals have had 
to. The Court is not, however, disabled from applying customary law. For instance, the 
Statute incorporates customary international human rights law as an essential part of the 
Court’s applicable law.398 
The provisions of the Rome Statute concerning legality provide good protection against 
several problems of retroactivity. 399  First of all, the ban of analogy and requirement of 
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specificity are established expressly in the Statute. 400  The Statute also requires that 
ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of the accused (in dubio pro reo).401 In situations 
involving only State parties the ICC follows the stricter version of the principle of legality 
(nullum crimen sine praevia lege scripta).  However, problems may arise if the crimes are not 
defined with sufficient specificity (lex certa requirement) or if the Court interprets them 
expansively (lex stricta requirement).402  These situations are unlikely to occur since the 
definitions of crimes are most accurate. 
However, concern has been expressed particularly over the so-called “catchall” provision of 
the crimes against humanity, which includes “other inhumane acts of a similar character 
intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical 
health” to the definition of the crime.403 This provision is often characterized as a residual 
category of the crimes against humanity,404 a clause that can be used to fill in gaps when 
other crime definitions are not applicable. In Katanga, Pre-Trial Chamber I defined inhuman 
acts as serious violations of customary international law and norms of international human 
rights law, “which are of a similar nature and gravity to the acts referred to in article 7(1) of 
the Statute”.405 The definition of inhumane acts still remains vague.  
Unlike the UN Tribunals, the ICC does not have jurisdiction over incidents that have 
occurred before its creation.406 The creation of new jurisdiction retrospectively to deal with 
crimes that have already happened is accepted in ICL. 407  However, as Gallant notes, 
retroactive court creation contains a danger of political abuse of the prosecution process.408 In 
addition, since the ICC is created by a treaty, it most likely does not have to question its legal 
basis, as the UN Tribunals have done.409 Thus the ICC is walking on safer ground in this 
respect. 
However, the ICC may gain jurisdiction retrospectively over persons and crimes that were 
outside its jurisdiction at the time of commission (as long as the crimes were committed after 
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its creation). There are at least two ways in which the ICC may do this.410 Firstly, a non-party 
State may accept the jurisdiction of the ICC over acts that have already occurred.411 Secondly, 
the UN Security Council may refer a situation involving non-party State to the ICC 
retrospectively.412 In both of these cases, the ICC would be able to prosecute crimes over 
which it had neither jurisdiction to prescribe nor jurisdiction to adjudicate at the time of 
commission. This raises a question whether the Court can apply the provisions of the Rome 
Statute in these situations since a person who is national of a non-party State and who has 
committed an act in a non-party State before the ICC’s intervention has not been bound by 
the provisions of the Rome Statute at the time of commission. According to Gallant, the 
prosecution in these two situations requires some other source of substantive law applicable 
at the time, so the Court would most likely apply customary international law existing at the 
time of commission.413 
It is controversial whether the crimes of the Rome Statute can be applied to acts committed 
before the Security Council’s referral or acceptance of jurisdiction by a non-party State. 
While Gallant argues that this is inconsistent with the Statute’s provisions concerning legality, 
some authors approve this, at least in cases of referral by the Council.414  According to 
Schabas, article 22(1) of the Rome Statute “excludes any possibility of prosecutions for 
offences based solely upon customary law.”415 Thus, the Court would have no choice but to 
apply the provisions of the Statute to such acts. What is evident, however, is that when ICC 
obtains jurisdiction retrospectively, it does not apply the strictest version of the principle of 
legality. 
On the face of it, there would be no contradiction if all the crime definitions in the Rome 
Statute were exactly the same as in customary international law. But this is hardly so. 
Although most of the subject-matter provisions of the Rome Statute are similar with 
customary law provisions, the Rome Statute clearly distinguishes between the law of the 
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Statute and the law outside the Statute.416 In fact, the extremely detailed definitions of the 
core crimes complemented by the Elements of Crimes seem to response to the indeterminacy 
that prevails over the customary law definitions of these crimes. Yet again, the crime 
definitions of the Rome Statute have contributed to the content of customary international 
law to some extent.  
In the end, the law of the ICC is far more foreseeable and accessible than the law of the 
Tribunals. Schabas emphasizes that the provision of the Rome Statute on strict construction 
marks a contrast with the jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals, which has given only little 
significance to this principle. In respect of applicable law, the crime definitions of the Rome 
Statute correspond largely with their customary law counterparts. This means that the even if 
the ICC would gain jurisdiction retrospectively, the number of situations where judges of the 
ICC had to figure whether a crime in the Rome Statute constitutes also a crime under 
customary international law is most likely to remain low. 
Gallant argues that a strict recourse to legal principle is essential if ICL is to become a 
convincing enterprise. According to him, stricter enforcement of legality is needed to make 
international criminal justice system more effective. However, it is most unlikely that the 
strictest form of legality, i.e., nullum crimen sine lege praevia scripta, would be applied in 
ICL. Hardly even the ICC will amount to this in its jurisprudence.417 
9.2 The End of an Era: Judicial Law-Making at its Close 
When evaluating the jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals one should bear in mind the 
circumstances in which the courts were established. Indeed, the timing for their establishment 
was propitious for the progressive development of ICL. The evolution of individual 
accountability and crime definitions that started at the WWII tribunals, but froze for the Cold 
War period, started to flourish again in the 1990s. Accordingly, some have characterized the 
end of the Cold War as the beginning of the “renaissance of international criminal justice”.418 
The end of the 20th century was an era “marked by goodwill, enthusiasm, and great 
expectations”.419  Moreover, it was the time for judicial law-making. 
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As there prevailed no consensus over the content of ICL, the establishment of the ad hoc 
Tribunals was a step towards a more coherent set of rules, and this certainly contributed to 
the drafting of the Rome Statute. Thus, one could say that the power of elaborating new rules 
of international law was transferred from State conferences, via the Security Council, to 
judges’ chambers at the ad hoc Tribunals. Yet, it was still the law of the States, since the 
Tribunals were only allowed to search for already existing rules that had emerged from the 
States’ own practices and declarations. 
Although the legitimacy of the UN Tribunals is nowadays widely accepted, one should not 
disregard that they still represent remarkable exceptions as an institutions applying criminal 
legislation since they are courts operating without criminal codes. Therefore, it has been 
largely for the judges to discover the unwritten rules of ICL they were to apply. In the 
absence of consistent State practice or even international judicial praxis in which to rely on it 
seems almost ironical that the subject-matter jurisdiction of the ad hoc Tribunals was decided 
to derive from customary international law. The judges were forced to create the body of law 
out of the scarce material they had in their hands. Their work answered to the needs of the 
time, but now time has changed. Although the judicial activism of domestic courts is 
predicted to continue in the future,420 the case may not be the same for international criminal 
courts. Several authors foresee that the era of judicial law-making may be coming to an end 
as the ad hoc Tribunals are ending their work.421 
The starting point of the ad hoc Tribunals must be contrasted with the establishment of the 
ICC. During the 1990s, ICL underwent a significant transition from underdeveloped body of 
law to a more coherent system that is now rich with international jurisprudence. This made 
the job easier for the drafters of the Rome Statute since they could pick and choose applicable 
rules from the practice of the Tribunals. It is no coincidence that the ICC’s provisions on war 
crimes in non-international armed conflict, for example, are quite similar with the findings of 
the ICTY. The ICC, a treaty-based institution with an elaborated and nearly exhaustive 
Statute, has no need to rely on customary law inasmuch as the Tribunals were forced to. Even 
if it does this, the customary rules it relies on may already be discovered and defined by the 
Tribunals with sufficient clarity.  
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As noted, the application of the principle of legality is becoming increasingly comprehensive. 
This can be noticed in several ways. The increasing codification of ICL and the establishment 
of the ICC have played a major role in this respect, but one must not forget the work that the 
ad hoc Tribunals have done. Even though their jurisprudence has downplayed the importance 
of the strict recourse to the principle of legality, the judges have acknowledged the 
importance of this principle in international criminal proceedings. Even a quick overview on 
the bulk of the arguments used in the aforementioned cases reveals that the more judges of 
the ad hoc Tribunals have departed from clear cut regulations the more they have put on an 
effort in explaining these deviations in terms of legality. As demonstrated, the recourse to the 
stricter version of the principle of legality (nullum crimen sine praevia lege scripta) seems to 
be an ascending trend. 
9.3 The Fragmentation of Customary International Criminal Law 
The increasing number of autonomous and hierarchically equal international criminal courts 
and tribunals has resulted to a number of divergent interpretations and applications of ICL. 
As each court produces its own substantive law, disparities cannot be avoided. 422  The 
horizontal relationship of international criminal courts causes fragmentation since there is no 
entity that would have the authority to decide which interpretation of law is correct. In 
addition, there exist inconsistencies between international law and national laws that cannot 
be fixed.423  
As a necessary change to this state of affairs, several scholars suggest some kind of 
harmonization of international law. This could be carried out by creating authoritative 
judicial bodies424 or other entities425 at the international level. One should neither forget the 
importance of the ICRC-study nor the Rome Statute as some degree of codifications of 
customary international law. But as Koskenniemi notes, it is an insurmountably problematic 
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idea that one authority would have the capacity, in the name of objectivity and neutrality, to 
speak for everyone, to express the viewpoint of all.426 On the other hand one can ask whether 
such harmonization is necessary. 427  Jérome de Hemptinne argues that the international 
criminal justice system is in need of certain decentralization in order to improve its cohesion, 
efficiency, and transparency. According to him, future international criminal prosecutions 
should be directed to regional or sub-regional internationalized ad hoc courts, where the trials 
would be as close as possible to the population concerned.428 
Universalization of ICL is a complex matter since criminal law is in the very heart of the 
sovereignty of States. Different criminal traditions may diverge so profoundly that they are 
not compatible with each other. Cassese proposes that some primacy should be given to 
international rules over national laws.429 However, one should take account the decentralized 
structure of the international criminal justice system. Prosecuting perpetrators of the core 
crimes in sub-regional ad hoc courts allows judges to take account the cultural underpinnings 
of the local legal tradition(s). 
As a consequence, this would inevitably cause some fragmentation of ICL. It is though better 
compared to an aspiration towards universal, no doubt Western-modeled criminal justice 
system that would not take account the diversity of regional legal traditions. To make a point, 
such fundamental concepts as “freedom” have different meaning in Islamic (legal) tradition. 
In respect of this, grounding general custom on principles such as “the principle of human 
dignity” would certainly arouse disagreement on the content of law. These regional 
differences are perceptible not only at domestic level but also in different international 
criminal tribunals. 
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In the field of Human rights law there is a number of regional human rights courts promoting 
regional human rights standards. As there seems to be no single future for these courts, as 
Evans suggests,430 it may be that there is no such thing for international criminal courts either. 
It could be that the interaction between the ECtHR and the ICTY may not have that much 
effect on the ICL as a whole but as a regional phenomenon. Thus, the customary law made in 
the ad hoc Tribunals may be only regional or tribunal-specific.431 Thus, we should not focus 
our attention on whether fragmentation of ICL is something to object but rather how we are 
to manage it.432 
First of all, ICL should acknowledge the environment in which it operates. Consistency at the 
international level may cause inconsistencies at the domestic level.433 The SCSL, for instance, 
operates in such circumstances where it has to take account certain national crimes under 
Sierra Leonean law. Greenawalt has addressed the impact of domestic laws in ICL in his 
paper on pluralism. Rather than aspiring to form a single universal code of ICL, he 
distinguishes between four tiers of ICL: (1) universally binding law, (2) tribunals-specific law 
(3) restrains on domestic law, and (4) default law.434 As I focus on the law of international 
criminal courts, I see the distinction between universally binding law and tribunal-specific 
law very useful.  
According to Greenawalt, ICL establishes some common rules that are universally binding, 
e.g. the definitions of the core crimes and some liability forms.  I agree that the crime 
definitions of the war crimes, genocide, and the crimes against humanity are elaborated in 
case law and treaties to the extent that they amount to the corpus of universally binding 
ICL.435  This is due to the Genocide Convention, the Rome Statute, and most importantly, the 
jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals. What comes to tribunal-specific law, there is no need 
to unify inter alia procedural regulations or even some parts of substantive law of different 
international courts. The Rome Statute is very precise on this.436 
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As noted, customary international law has been a primary source of law in the ad hoc 
Tribunals whereas the Rome Statute has lowered it on the second place in its hierarchical 
layout of sources. 437  However, still the ICC possesses some “potential universality”, as 
Greenawalt puts it.438 With a referral from the Security Council, the Court may be able 
broaden its jurisdictional scope to crimes committed anywhere in the world and in these cases 
it may have to apply rules of customary international law. In contrast to all former 
international criminal courts, the ICC “truly aspires to achieve universality in its application 
of ICL.”439 
Although the jurisprudence of the ICTY currently dominates ICL, the enterprise of 
international criminal justice is soon to exist in the form of the ICC. As noted, the 
jurisprudence of the ICC departs from the ad hoc Tribunals’ case law on some matters.440 In 
future, judges of the ICC have the power to choose whether they seek consistency with the 
jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals. By relying heavily on the Rome Statute in their 
practice they could diminish the importance of the law created by the Tribunals. But if the 
judges of the ICC were to follow the jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals they could 
participate in creating a coherent body of law that might come closer to universally applied 
ICL. However, the limits within which the judges work are somewhat narrow. If the 
jurisdictional scope of the Court is to be limited only to its member States, then its effect on 
the formation of customary ICL is going to be modest. 
To conclude, international courts are very diverse in reach (universal, regional), jurisdiction 
(general, regional), composition (international, hybrid) and substantive law. Bennouna notes 
that even though each court operates independently, they are not each entirely self-contained 
systems, as has been asserted by the ICTY. 441  There exists inevitably some degree of 
interaction between international tribunals since their judges cannot ignore other tribunals’ 
case law when dealing with same matters.442 Instead of aspiring to create a unitary ICL we 
should acknowledge the pluralism inherent in its creation, the fact that it builds upon several 
criminal justice systems.443 Although some fundamental merits (right to fair trial etc.) should 
                                               
437
 Id., art. 21.  
438
 Greenawalt 2011, p. 1079. 
439
 Kreß 2009, p. 143. 
440
 For example, ICC’s provisions concerning the defense of duress, aiding and abetting, and command 
responsibility differ from the case law of the ICTY. For aiding and abetting see Rome Statute art. 25(3)(c) and 
Furundžija. For command responsibility see Rome Statute art. 28. 
441
 Tadić Appeal Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 11. 
442
 Bennouna 2012, pp. 288-289. 
443
 Greenawalt 2011, p. 1129. 
90 
 
be uniform in all international proceedings, the usefulness of hybrid tribunals lies in the fact 
that they can pay attention the local social needs, cultural underpinnings, and objectives of 
national laws. 
 
10. Concluding Remarks 
 
It is phenomenal how international law, an instrument for governing State’s relations, has 
turned into a penal code applied in criminal proceedings. Considering the aims and purposes 
of the enterprise of international criminal justice, international law is still too centered on 
States. For instance, perpetrators of the core crimes still have good opportunities to hide 
behind the shield of a state’s sovereignty. To make the system more efficient and to fight 
against impunity, we must adapt to changes that have already occurred in the formation 
process of international rules since we need faster means to create obligations and 
prohibitions erga omnes. We must acknowledge that the emergence of individual 
accountability on the international stage has changed the understanding of the sources of 
international law. In respect of custom formation, the traditional theory of ascertaining 
customary law seems to be outdated in that nowadays entities other than States are gaining 
more and more ground in forming the practice and opinio of custom. In this respect, 
international criminal courts are playing an important role. 
International courts still try to resort to the two basic elements of custom in identifying 
customary law. However, they seem to acknowledge the changing nature of international law 
and its sources. In general, the addressed case law reveals that the amount of support that a 
customary norm requires from State practice and opinio juris seems to depend on the value 
and importance of the norm in question. Even case law that may not have been in-line with 
the principle of legality can be accepted as legitimate for future application. Particularly in 
the field of ICL, fundamental moral and ethical values have infiltrated the process and 
transformed it into a more opinio juris oriented activity. 
The rules of customary ICL are often identified in international proceedings, an act which 
itself contributes to creating those rules, by not only identifying them but also evidencing 
their existence. Sometimes the element of State practice, i.e., external behavior of States, 
becomes almost irrelevant because large amount of the practice that creates the rule arises out 
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of the identification process itself. Indeed, the post-Cold War phenomenon called 
judicialization of international law has been very much alive in the ad hoc Tribunals.444 It is 
important that international criminal judges acknowledge the significant role they play in the 
process and remain cautious when identifying rules that do not clearly represent lex lata.  
10.1 Law of the ad hoc Tribunals 
The law of international crimes is a body of law that has been refined on several occasions by 
international criminal courts, particularly the ad hoc Tribunals. As Mettraux notes, one of the 
major achievements of the ad hoc Tribunals was uncovering a whole body of law that had 
been hidden during the Cold War. By identifying these rules, whose existence under 
international law was uncertain, the Tribunals have steered international law towards a more 
human rights-oriented reading. 445  However, the jurisprudence of the Tribunals includes 
several inconsistencies between various decisions, judgments, and obiter dicta. A reasonable 
observer does not rely on individual cases but tries to see the big picture. Even international 
judges make mistakes or change their views along with changing societal conditions and 
moral values. Some cases represent remarkable precedents, some deplorable deviations from 
the main policy.  Lessons must be learned, and the legacy of the Tribunals lies in both their 
achievements and their errors. 
The ad hoc Tribunals' use of sources to define, among other things, elements of crimes and 
forms of personal criminal liability has been an area of controversy and disagreement. Their 
methods have been pragmatic and aspirational and they have often associated customary law 
with the other sources of law, namely general principles of law and judicial decision. This has 
obscured the content and even the whole concept of custom; it has become a general source 
of law that comprehends all kinds of activities and values. But this has not merely been a 
choice of the judges of the ad hoc Tribunals, rather, it seems that they had no other options 
for dealing with the situation because there simply were not enough rules for them to apply. 
Regardless of the significant contribution of the ad hoc Tribunals’ jurisprudence, ICL still 
remains a fragmented and imperfect body of law. The law of the ad hoc Tribunals does not 
represent universally applicable criminal law. 446 However, other courts, both domestic and 
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international, have adopted several of the Tribunals’ developments. Some of these 
developments have even made their way into the Rome Statute. Thus, it is evident that the 
Tribunals have developed ICL to some extent. Although the Tribunals’ job has been to 
identify rules that were already beyond doubt part of customary international law, some of 
the rules will only achieve their final customary law status outside the jurisprudence of the 
Tribunals after they have been approved by the community of nations. The future work of the 
ICC, principally the extent to which its judges appreciate the law of the ad hoc Tribunals, will 
be prominent.  
10.2 The Principle of Legality 
The principle of legality, which has allegedly obtained a status of customary international 
law, 447  has increased in significance to ICL after the World War II trials. Still, in the 
jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals the ban of retroactivity and the requirement of 
specificity have bent before the needs of justice. In some cases, the manifest wrongfulness of 
the conduct has provided the justification for criminal convictions. As to foreseeability, 
incurring punishment for acts malum in se prevails over a rigid positivist approach to 
definitions of crimes. As Van Schaack writes, within ICL foreseeability builds upon several 
factors, such as applicable domestic law, universal moral values expressed in human rights 
law, developments in humanitarian law, prevailing circumstances, and overall changes in 
international order.448 
This results from the more complicated criminalization process in international law which 
causes the definitions of crimes to be more ambiguous and open to interpretation. Since 
international criminal courts have mainly operated with customary law in the 20th century the 
principle of legality has obtained distinctive features in international proceedings compared 
to its national counterparts. It has proved to be more flexible, allowing judges to invoke 
objectives of ICL and the immorality of acts as interpretational methods in determining the 
legal limits of criminal offences and liability forms. Although the ad hoc Tribunals’ work has 
been subject to severe criticism, they seem to have followed the human rights standards of 
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legality set out by the ECtHR since they provided interpretations of law that have been 
reasonably foreseeable and consistent with the essence of the offences.  
These rather ambiguous standards clarify the contradiction between customary law and the 
ban of retroactivity. Although the principle of legality requires that crimes be defined 
beforehand and with sufficient clarity, crimes based on customary international law are 
inherently indeterminable; one cannot determine the exact moment they started to exist, i.e., 
became punishable under international law. Even judgments of international criminal courts 
may not suffice to prove the universal customary status of a rule, as evidenced by cases 
concerning the defense of duress and the JCE doctrine. Under one perspective, these courts 
do not create rules of customary international law but only declare their existence under the 
given court’s jurisdiction. 
In terms of foreseeability, Schabas provides the most enlightening view of its true essence in 
customary law: "Even if law is not written down, this does not mean it did not begin at some 
point in time. The existence of the norm is explained by evolving values and their attendant 
prohibition. These are foreseeable and accessible to a potential offender. We do not need 
abstract and eternal morality to get this result."449 Deviating from strict adherence to the 
nullum crimen principle is approved whenever the offence engages vital moral values. This is 
evident from the spousal rape cases of the English common law system to the evolving 
definitions of the international crime of rape. As moral values continue to develop, so do the 
definitions of crimes, liability forms, rules of immunities, etc. Although judges know the law 
and are obligated to apply it, individuals often evaluate their acts on the basis of their moral 
perceptions. Thus, the foreseeability of a criminal conduct always relies on moral perceptions 
and evolving values of society. This is evident with respect to the core crimes since they are 
associated with the core values of the international community. 
10.3 Between Justice and Legality 
From the Nuremberg trials onward the principle of legality has been characterized as a 
“general principle of justice”.450 Considering the tension between justice and legality in the 
judicial process (the fact that the principle of legality ensures mainly the rights of the accused, 
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not victims), this may come across as a rather contradictory expression, but it reveals the 
juxtaposition that is inherent to international criminal proceedings. 
International criminal judges are forced to balance positive law and natural law approaches. 
Even as they attempt to avoid producing an unjust outcome they must also make every 
endeavor for maintaining the credibility of the international criminal justice system. Since 
international criminal trials are usually carried out after devastating events that have shocked 
the world order, these courts’ establishments may often be politically affected and their 
proceedings under high public attention. Therefore, judges of these courts are pressured to 
produce justice for the victims as well as respond to public expectations, concerns that should 
not be part of the judicial process. The challenge international criminal judges face is 
ineffably formidable. In order to meet this challenge, they must provide solutions that are 
both just and (objectively) ascertainable.  
Given this, it may often be difficult for the judges to distinguish between lex lata and lex 
ferenda, but also between legal and moral norms. Nevertheless, searching for rules that go 
beyond existing law diminishes their validity since they become vulnerable to subjective 
perceptions. The principle of legality simply rejects the idea that a judge would know what 
justice is. If this was the case, no laws would be needed in the first place. Thus, the rule in 
question should always be objectively ascertainable. In this objective inquiry, judges distance 
their rulings from their subjective perceptions. But as we have seen, the eye of the law is not 
omniscient. Hence, judicial arguments identifying the boundaries of criminal conduct cannot 
always (if ever) resort solely to strict legality, but must reconcile strict legality and 
substantive justice. It is left to judges to decide where the line should be drawn. 
10.4 The Future of Judicial Law-Making  
Over the last two decades ICL has undergone a tremendous transformation due to the 
establishment of several international criminal courts. In the absence of positive law ICL has 
operated largely on the basis of substantive justice. Now, as the ad hoc Tribunals are ending 
their work and the ICC is starting to produce its judicial praxis the ascending trend leans 
towards strict legality. This means that statutory texts are gaining more ground and, as a 
result, the principle of legality is becoming a more rigid rule (rather than a principle of justice) 
allowing no deviations even in exceptional circumstances.  
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The desire to punish the perpetrators of the core crimes by any means necessary remains 
strong in the international community. However, a transformation of the nullum crimen 
principle from sine iure to sine lege is an ascending trend, a direction of change welcomed by 
all the supporters of international criminal justice. Fidelity to law becomes reality in judicial 
proceedings as ICL is positivising; the definitions of crimes are determined more precisely 
and they are codified in written instruments. Because of the recent developments in ICL, 
international criminal courts may no longer be compelled to operate on the basis of 
substantive justice. Instead, they are afforded the opportunity to improve the legal basis of 
ICL by heading towards strict legality, as Cassese predicted. While the ICL has, throughout 
history, been in a continuous phase of transition, the incipient era marks the end of 
substantive law’s most dynamic transitory phase. 
 
Afterword 
 
Judicial praxis that interprets and develops law at the same time is like a vicious cycle. By 
identifying a rule that has generated from custom, judges simultaneously generate custom by 
verifying the existence of that rule. There is no doubt that they work within the customary 
law-making process. On the judge’s bench customary law becomes a self-producing product 
that increases at the same rate as judges do their work. This can be seen as a hermeneutic 
process in which judges create content for the rules they aspire to discover. 
Usually when judges try to find support for their findings on customary law they turn to the 
basic elements, the practice and opinion of States, but in fact it may be the establishment of 
the rule that provides the necessary and vital support for its existence and its future 
application. Sometimes the rule in the formation becomes dependent on the judicial process 
establishing it. Therefore, identifying the rule does not always result in distinguishing 
between lex lata and lex ferenda. This encompasses the whole framework of the interpretive 
process and its inability to keep legislative and judicial tasks separate. 
It has been my intention to clarify the process of the formation of customary law within ICL 
rather than to obscure it. Hopefully I have managed to do this. In addition, I have tried to 
introduce readers to some important issues concerning the progressive development of 
customary international law. At the end of the day, a number of questions still remain 
unsolved. Many of them are questions to which no legal answers can be given. 
